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Natural Gas Price Escalation Clauses: A
Legal and Economic Analysis
David Crump*
INTRODUCTION
Natural gas is an inexpensive, clean, and efficient fuel for
many fixed-location uses.1 Its importance to both residential
and industrial users has caused sharp differences in attitude
among producers and consumers.2 These differences are inten-
sified by the division of the country into producing and consum-
ing regions3 and by a federal regulatory system that has been
the subject of justified criticism.4 At the same time, the deplet-
able nature of natural gas, together with the laws of economics,
have caused the price of natural gas to increase. Recently,
these factors have combined to produce complex and protracted
litigation over natural gas contracts.
Long-term natural gas contracts usually contain what are
known as price escalation clauses. These clauses are as much a
part of the consideration for the contract as the initial purchase
price.5 Often a price escalation clause causes a given contract
price to increase significantly over a period of years. With tens
or even hundreds of millions of dollars at stake, disputes con-
cerning natural gas contracts often occur. The interpretation
and enforceability of an escalation clause is often at the heart
of the controversy.
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law.
1. See, e.g., E. NEUNER, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY (1960). See gener-
ally UNITED STATES DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE CURRENT STATE OF THE NATURAL
GAS MARKET 83-101 (1981)..
2. For example, in the fall of 1982 voters in several industrial states ap-
proved referenda authorizing commissions to combat increases in gas prices.
See Natural Gas Regulation and Market Disorder, 18 TULSA L.J. 619, 619 n.4
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Natural Gas Regulation] (citing State Regulators
Take up Battle Against Rising Natural Gas Prices, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1983, at
25, col. 4).
3. Id. But cf. infra notes 233-236 and authorities cited therein (sug-
gesting that consuming regions might benefit from natural gas decontrol).
4. See infra notes 42-82 and accompanying text.
5. See E. NEUNER, supra note 1, at 266-69.
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The typical dispute begins when a purchaser of natural gas
refuses to pay an increased price demanded by a producer pur-
suant to an escalation clause. When the producer sues to en-
force the contract, the purchaser may defend on various
grounds, including assertions that the escalation clause is un-
conscionable or against public policy.6 In addition, other defen-
sive theories, including those grounded in regulatory statutes,
common law, or principles of contract interpretation, are also
frequently based on public policy arguments.7 These argu-
ments, in turn, force courts to consider whether there is suffi-
cient justification for the use of price escalation clauses.
This Article attempts to explain the persuasive economic
justifications for escalation clauses in order to aid the interpre-
tation of natural gas' contracts and the determination of public
policy defenses asserted against them. The Article begins by
setting forth essential aspects of the natural gas industry, in-
cluding the roles of producers, pipelines, and distributors, the
types of escalation clauses in general use, and the impact of the
federal regulatory system on natural gas pricing. Next, the Ar-
ticle considers the economic arguments both for and against the
use of escalation clauses. Finally, the Article examines how
courts have dealt with these economic considerations in cases
involving pricing clauses in natural gas contracts.
I. ESCALATION CLAUSES AND THE NATURAL
GAS MARKET
Traditionally, the natural gas market has included produ-
cers, who produce and sell gas; pipelines, which purchase gas
from producers for sale to direct customers or to distributors;
and distributors, who purchase gas from pipelines and sell it to
ultimate consumers.8 This simple model is subject to varia-
6. See infra notes 238-257 and accompanying text.
There are some opinions, based upon early positions taken by the Federal
Power Commission (FPC), acknowledging or accepting arguments that escala-
tors of certain kinds may contravene public policy. The FPC altered its inter-
pretation, and modern cases reject the argument. See infra note 238.
7. For example, the purchaser may use arguments supported by refer-
ence to regulatory statutes to claim that price clauses should not be enforced
so as to require prices to rise in a manner unrelated to alleged legislative
purposes.
8. See generally E. NEUNER, supra note 1, at 1-79 (discussing concentra-
tion of the natural gas supply market and price and demand patterns in vari-
ous geographic regions); Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and
Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARv. L. REV. 345 (1983) (analyz-
ing the structure of the "downstream" gas market and the effect of regulation
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tions: for example, pipelines may own production, may agree to
carry someone else's gas without purchasing it, or may sell to
intermediaries other than distributors.9 For purposes of this
Article, however, it is sufficient to treat the producer as the
seller of gas and the pipeline as its purchaser for resale.
A. THE IMPACT OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS ON
PRICING PROVISIONS
Natural gas is generally sold through long-term contracts,
typically with terms lasting for decades. Pipelines purchasing
gas have historically insisted on long-term contracts because an
assured supply of gas is necessary to obtain both regulatory ap-
proval and financing for their projects.10 A natural gas pipeline
requires a substantial fixed investment and, once in place, it
cannot be moved about like a garden hose.
Unfortunately, however, the supply of natural gas is de-
pletable, and its market value must rise over the long term.1 '
The federal regulatory scheme nevertheless has historically
constrained prices.-2 During the 1970's, when natural gas
shortages 13 produced layoffs, plant closings, hardships, and
even deaths,14 it became clear to all informed observers that
the market price of gas would rise.15 Accordingly, the negotia-
tion of natural gas contracts has, for several years, required the
parties to set fair prices for the duration of a long-term contract
in a market in which prices are expected to rise.' 6
aimed at curing alleged market imperfections); UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF EN-
ERGY, THE CURRENT STATE OF THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 7-12 (1981) (dis-
cussing the evolution and regulation of the natural gas industry).
9. See supra note 8.
10. E. NEUNER, supra note 1, at 265-66.
11. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 42-82 and accompanying text; see also Breyer &
MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Pro-
ducers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 941, 974-75 (1973) (comparing actual average gas
prices to "unregulated" prices derived from economic models).
13. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
15. See generally P. STARRATT, THE NATURAL GAS SHORTAGE AND THE
CONGRESS 37-38 (1974) ("The imbalance... can be seen as a virtually inevita-
ble result of the low regulated producer prices."); Breyer & MacAvoy, Regulat-
ing Natural Gas Producers, in ENERGY SUPPLY AND GOVERNMENT POLiCY 182
(R. Kalter & W. Vogelay eds. 1976) ("In the absence of price ceilings, higher
prices would have been specified .... and significantly greater new reserve
commitments might have been made .... [Tihe demand response should also
have been substantial.").
16. E. NEUNER, supra note 1, at 265-66. See also Pierce, Natural Gas Regu-
lation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REv. 63, 77-82 (1982).
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There are two ways in which a buyer and seller can agree
on fair prices in such a situation. One theoretical method is by
agreeing to a constant price over the life of the contract. A con-
stant price would have to be set very high, well above the mar-
ket price for gas at the time of contracting, to reflect the fact
that it would be well below the market price at the end of the
contract term twenty or so years later. Very high initial prices,
however, are undesirable to a purchaser.17 Additionally, they
are unfair to a utility's customers, because a consumer is forced
to pay above market rates during the initial year while a con-
sumer at the end of the contract term receives a subsidy.
A second and more desirable way to set contract prices in a
fluctuating market is to use an index that ties the contract
price to the market price of the commodity. This approach is
reflected in escalation clauses. This measure of the contract
price may be prices paid by the same or other purchasers, or it
may be prices prevailing for other fuels, or it may be price ceil-
ings set by the government;' 8 but the purpose is the same in
each case: to provide a mechanism that keeps the contract
price roughly related to market levels as market prices rise.19
In this manner, producers can be induced to commit supply for
long terms, and purchasers can be assured of paying prices sim-
ilar to those paid by others in the market.
B. TYPES OF PRICING CLAUSES IN GAS CONTRACTS
Fixed price contracts can be found today, but they are gen-
erally relics of history. At one time, substantial amounts of gas
were sold for long terms at fixed prices, and some producing
fields are still governed by them. This gas may be sold for pen-
nies per thousand cubic feet (Mcf), far below the market
level.20 Similarly, there are some fixed-escalation contracts still
in existence, limiting increases to definite, periodic increments
such as a certain number of cents per unit per month or year.2 1
17. The purchaser would be unable to resell at a price higher than his
purchase price, and the impracticality of carrying the necessary credit over the
life of the contract would be prohibitive even if a constant price arrangement
were itself considered desirable.
18. See infra notes 20-41 and accompanying text.
19. See E. NEUNER, supra note 1, at 265-66; Pierce, supra note 16, at 78, 94.
20. See E. NEUNER, supra note 1, at 265-66.
21. See Pierce, supra note 16, at 80; see also DECISION ANALYSIS CORP.,
ANALYSIS OF NATURAL GAS PRODUCER/INTERSTATE PIPELINE CONTRACTS 5
(1981) (study sponsored by the American Gas Ass'n) [hereinafter cited as AGA
STUDY].
[Vol. 70:61
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Again, these clauses result in prices far below the market-clear-
ing level.2 2
In contrast to these fixed price contracts, most modern con-
tracts include indefinite price escalation clauses.23 There are a
number of different types of indefinite price escalation clauses
in use. A "favored nations"24 clause, for example, ties the con-
tract price to the rates paid to other sellers.2 A "two party"
favored nations clause requires the purchaser to pay a contract
price equivalent to the highest price it pays to any other pro-
ducer.26 This arrangement gives the purchaser some control
over contract prices, since it can avoid or limit escalation by its
own future purchases. A "third party" favored nations clause
requires the purchaser to pay a contract price equivalent to the
highest price paid by any purchaser to any producer in a given
geographic area.27
Favored nations clauses vary significantly from contract to
contract.28 Important subjects of negotiation include the geo-
graphic area in which comparison sales are to be considered,
the procedures by which price increases are triggered, and the
types of sales to be taken into account.29 A third party favored
nations clause with wide geographical limits and liberal inclu-
sion of comparative contracts may cause the contract price to
escalate more frequently, and to advance generally ahead of
market price levels; a two-party favored nations clause with
22. See supra note 21 and authorities cited therein.
23. Of interstate gas contracts for "old" gas, the majority contained some
kind of indefinite price escalator as of 1981. AGA STUDY, supra note 21, at 5;
see also infra notes 25, 31, 38.
24. Favored nations clauses take their name from the law governing inter-
national trade, under which a country entitled to most favored nation status
accedes to the same tariff or other requirements as the most favorably treated
nation. See E. NEUNER, supra note 1, at 91; see also 8 H. WnLuAMs & C. MEY-
ERS, OiL & GAs LAw 514 (1984); Pierce, supra note 16, at 80-81.
25: As of 1981, 83% of interstate contracts for "old" gas contained favored
nations clauses. AGA STUDY, supra note 21, at 14.
26. E. NEUNER, supra note 1, at 91; see also 8 H. Wn.IMks & C. MEYERS,
supra note 24, at 514; Pierce, supra note 16, at 80-81.
27. See supra note 26.
28. See E. NEUNER, supra note 1, at 271. Compare the two-party clause at
issue in Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 604 F.2d 1281, 1282 (10th
Cir. 1979) (requiring buyer to pay seller a price equal to the highest price paid
by buyer to any seller in the area), affd, 758 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985) with the
third party clause in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 673 F.2d 323,
324 (10th Cir.) (specifying a date on which the contract price would rise to the
highest price received by any producer in the area), cert denied, 459 U.S. 989
(1982).
29. E. NEUNER, supra note 1, at 98, 272.
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narrow geographical limits and confined to certain kinds of
contracts, on the other hand, would tend to lag behind the mar-
ket. In either event, the comparison to other contract prices
provides an index that ties the contract price, albeit roughly, to
the market on a continuing basis.30
Another frequently used indefinite price escalator is the
"area rate" clause, also known as an "FPC [Federal Power
Commission] price protection" or "J & R" clause.3 ' Such
clauses, like favored nations clauses, may be worded in various
ways, but their effect is to index the contract price to the high-
est federally regulated price ceiling3 2 for the geographic area in
which the natural gas well is located. Some area rate clauses
limit escalation to ceilings for gas of the same regulatory cate-
gory, while others do not. Ambiguity surrounding this issue
has given rise to litigation.33 Similarly, some area rate clauses
expressly incorporate price ceilings set by successors to the
FPC, while others do not. Again, ambiguities have created liti-
gation because of the abolition of the FPC and its replacement
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which
now administers congressionally legislated price ceilings.3
30. See Pierce, supra note 16, at 81.
31. As of 1981, 89% of the interstate contracts for "old" gas contained area
rate clauses. AGA STiJDy, supra note 21, at 8. The name is derived from a
regulatory variation in which the FPC set prices by producer areas. See infra
notes 42-82 and accompanying text. The "J & R" designation reflects typical
reference in such clauses to "just and reasonable" rates set by the FPC.
32. For a discussion of federal price ceilings, see infra notes 57-60 and ac-
companying text.
33. E.g., Tuthill v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 614 S.W.2d 205, 210-11
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that price under
particular contract, because it referred to "applicable" regulatory ceilings, es-
calated only to "old" gas ceiling, even though a differently drafted contract
could have caused escalation to "new" gas rates because the sale was for intra-
state consumption); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 674
S.W.2d 469, 472-73 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that
the FPC's--and subsequently the Natural Gas Policy Act's (NGPA)-classifi-
cation of well vintaging rather than contract vintaging applied to trigger price
escalation clauses indexed to government price ceilings even though contract
vintaging was the rule at the time of contracting).
34. The litigation has been extensive and has produced widely differing
results, depending upon the clause, the evidence, and the court. Compare UGI
Corp. v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 80-1411, slip op. at 1-2 (E.D. Pa., Aug. 1, 1984)
(clause in contract "was not intended to allow collection of congressionally-
set" prices) and Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 230
Kan. 176, 183-85, 630 P.2d 1142, 1149 (1981) (holding that "NGPA did not trig-
ger a price increase because the contracts ... did not contain a sufficient esca-
lation mechanism) with Oxley v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., No. 55,655 (Okla.
Ct. App. May 4, 1982), reported in 53 OKLA. B.J. 1161, 1162 (1982), rev'd and
dissenting op. adopted, No. 55,655 (Okla. Oct. 4, 1982), reported in 53 OKLA.
[Vol. 70:61
PRICE ESCALATION CLAUSES
Currently, "FERC" clauses are in use, setting prices by refer-
ence to the FERC's actions pursuant to the Natural Gas Act35
and Natural Gas Policy Act.36 Area rate clauses are based on
the assumption that increases in regulatory price ceilings will
roughly correspond to the market price for natural gas.3 7 Thus,
area rate clauses are another way of ensuring that the contract
price, although it may not be precisely the level set by the mar-
ket, will at least be related to it.
There are several other kinds of natural gas price escala-
tion clauses in current use. For example, clauses indexing the
contract price to the market price of No. 2 or No. 6 heating oil,
as reflected in standard reference works such as Platt's Oil-
gram Price Service, are increasingly common.38 Deregulation
clauses, which provide for a change of index if price ceilings are
removed from the gas subject to the contract, are also in cur-
rent use.39 A further development, which is the natural result
of the evolution of gas transactions, is the recent appearance of
"market-clearing price" escalation clauses in some contracts, ty-
ing contract prices more directly to the market.40
Finally, different indexes may be used in combination. For
example, a favored nations clause may refer to the average of
the two or three highest prices in the area, or clauses them-
B.J. 2383, 2383 (1982) (intermediate appellate court's holding that area rate
clause provides for "going market rate" reversed and remanded by Oklahoma
Supreme Court for evidentiary hearing on parties' intent).
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) initially held that
area rate clauses failed to furnish authority for escalation to NGPA rates, then
it reversed itself in a series of complex opinions dependent on presumptions
based on the wording of individual contracts that could be overcome by evi-
dence of intent. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1982).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
37. See Pierce, supra note 16, at 81.
38. In 1981, eight percent of interstate contracts for "old" gas referred to
No. 2"oil, and three percent referred to No. 6 oil. AGA STuDY, supra note 21,
at 14; see also Pierce, supra note 16, at 81 n.71. These commodities compete
with, or, as an economist would say, are for some purposes "substitute goods"
for, natural gas. See Natural Gas Regulation, supra note 2, at 622-23.
39. The contract may provide for a change of index upon deregulation (for
example, if it contains a reference to regulatory ceilings that would cease to
exist upon deregulation). Alternatively, the contract may provide for renegoti-
ation or for other specified alternatives. See Natural Gas Regulation, supra
note 2, at 627-28.
40. See FoSTER NAT. GAs REP. No. 1477, Aug. 2, 1984, at 3 (reporting upon
contract between Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America and Kerr-McGee Corp.,
with 15-year term and price at the pipeline's "market-clearing price," defined
as the average price representing its market competition less certain factors
such as transportation costs, taxes, etc.).
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selves may be used in combination. Inclusion of a fixed price
escalation clause and an indefinite escalation clause, such as a
favored nations or area rate clause, is typical of this variation.4-
C. THE FEDERAL REGULATORY SCHEME
Natural gas price escalation clauses must be understood
against the backdrop of a complex and changing federal regula-
tory system.4 In 1938, prompted by a Federal Trade Commis-
sion study43 of pipelines," Congress passed the Natural Gas Act
41. For example, the contract at issue in UGI Corp. v. Amoco Prod. Co.,
No. 80-1411 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 1983) (opinion denying summary judgment),
provided for (1) a fixed price escalator of three cents per thousand cubic feet
(Mcf) semi-annually; (2) a favored nations clause tied to the average of the two
highest prices paid by certain named purchasers within the contract area, re-
ferred to as a "redetermination" clause; (3) an area rate clause, and (4) a limit
upon both indefinite escalators in the form of a maximum price determined by
reference to prices in Platt's Oilgram Price Service. Id., slip op. at 3.
42. For a concise history of regulation from the enactment of the Natural
Gas Act (NGA) through the administration of the NGPA, see Manning, Fed-
eral Regulation of Pricing Provisions in Natural Gas Sales Contracts--From
the Phillips Decision to the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 16 Hous. L. REV.
1081 (1979); Nordhaus, Producer Regulation and the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, 19 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 829, 830-57 (1979); see also Note, Legislative His-
tory of the Natural Gas Policy Act: Title I, 59 TEX. L. REV. 101, 106, 121 (1980)
(examining the historical background of natural gas regulation in order to un-
derstand and apply the legislative purpose of the NGPA). For coverage with
emphasis on the NGPA, see MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 19
NAT. RusoURcEs J. 811 (1979); Morgan & Patterson, The Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978: Four Years of Practice and Two Years to Make Perfec 71 KY.
L.J. 105, 107 (1982); Pannill, Reform of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 17
TULSA L.J. 54, 57, 74 (1981); Ringleb, Natural Gas Producer Price Regulation
Under the NGPA" Regulatory Failure, Alternatives, and Reform, 20 Hous. L.
REV. 709, 713-25, 736-40 (1983); cf. Natural Gas Regulation, supra note 2, at
628-34 (discussing pipeline regulation under the NGA and producer regulation
under the NGA and NGPA).
43. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, UTILITY CORPORATIONS--FNAL REPORT No.
84-A, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) [hereinafter cited as FTC RE-
PORT]. See generally Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Ac 44 GEO.
L.J. 695, 696-721 (1956) (reviewing bills, hearings, and committee reports be-
ginning in 1928 that led to the NGA).
44. The principal concern was with asserted abuses of monopoly by inter-
state pipelines. State regulation affecting interstate sales by pipelines gener-
ally had been held unconstitutional. See Missouri ex rel Barrett v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 307-10 (1924); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553, 595-600 (1923); cf. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252
U.S. 23, 31 (1920) (holding constitutional "local regulations of a reasonable
character" as applied to gas piped directly from the gas main into the state for
sale to local consumers). States were left free, both by the decisions and by
the NGA, to regulate intrastate pipelines, distribution, or production.
Nordhaus, supra note 42, at 829-30; Pierce, supra note 16, at 65.
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(NGA).45 This legislation gave the FPC responsibility for pro-
tecting consumers with respect to natural gas prices. The legis-
lation required that regulated rates be "just and reasonable. '46
The Act authorized the FPC to regulate "natural gas compa-
nies" and to set price limits on sales of gas for resale in inter-
state commerce. Thus, interstate pipelines were clearly
included. The FPC was prohibited, however, from regulating
the "production" of natural gas.47 The Act did not specify
whether "production" was limited to the producer's activities in
actually drilling for or producing gas, or whether it also in-
cluded wellhead sales by producers.48 In 1954, however, the
Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Wisconsin,49 which required the FPC to regulate
wellhead sales of natural gas intended for resale in the inter-
state market.
The FPC had declined to exercise jurisdiction over well-
head sales before Phillips. It regarded such regulation as
neither necessary nor appropriate, because it viewed the field
pricing of natural gas as competitive and not amenable to the
45. Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1982)).
46. NGA §§ 4, 5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d (1982).
47. NGA § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717b (1982).
48. The Commission's jurisdiction extended "to the sale in interstate com-
merce of natural gas for resale ... but ... not ... to the production or gath-
ering of natural gas." Id The ambiguity existed because producers sell gas for
resale (which would be covered if in interstate commerce), but they do so as a
part of production activities (which were exempt).
49. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
The decision was based upon a finding of congressional intent to confer
"Commission jurisdiction over the rates of all wholesales of natural gas in in-
terstate commerce, whether by a pipeline company or not .... " Id. at 682.
In the Court's view,
Regulation of the sales in interstate commerce for resale made by a
so-called independent natural-gas producer is not essentially different
from regulation of such sales when made by an affiliate of an inter-
state pipeline company. In both cases, the rates charged may have a
direct and substantial effect on the price paid by the ultimate consum-
ers. Protection of consumers against exploitation at the hands of nat-
ural gas companies was the primary aim of the Natural Gas Act ....
Attempts to weaken this protection by amendatory legislation ex-
empting independent natural gas producers from federal regulation
have repeatedly failed ....
Id. at 685.
Justice Douglas dissented on the grounds that the FPC's contemporaneous
and long-standing interpretation deserved respect, that rate setting for produ-
cers would require supervision of numerous producer activities, and that there
would be unintended adverse effects on production. Id at 689-90.
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kind of utility regulation that was applied to pipelines.50
Shortly after Phillips, Congress passed legislation reversing its
effect. President Eisenhower originally indicated he would sign
the legislation into law, but ultimately vetoed the bill because
of a scandal concerning an alleged bribe offered by an industry
lobbyist to a legislator.51 This historical accident, worthy of
soap opera drama, created an atmosphere in which deregulation
or even regulatory reform was politically impossible, and it
ushered in an era of natural gas price ceilings set by a reluctant
FPC using a dizzying, if not embarrassing, 52 sequence of differ-
ent approaches.
The FPC initially attempted to regulate more than eight
thousand gas producers53 by setting individual rates for each,
using the traditional utility method with which the Commission
was familiar.1 The difficulty of estimating costs and fair re-
turns for thousands of producers, however, created an enor-
mous backlog of cases.55 The Commission therefore shifted to
50. In re Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 F.P.C. 246, 278 (1951) (holding Phil-
lips' sales to be "part of Phillips gathering business process or at least an ex-
empt incident thereof"). Cf. Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 12, at 941-42 & n.5
(indicating that while the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), was arguably consistent with the legislative
history, it was not responsive to the underlying economic policy); Pierce, supra
note 16, at 66 n.14 (noting that although Court's reasoning was consistent with
legislative history, it did not address underlying economic policies).
51. See Johnson, Producer Rate Regulation in Natural Gas Certification
Proceedings: CATCO in Contex, 62 COLTJM. L. REv. 773, 783 n.57 (1962); see
also Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases, 428 F.2d 407, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 950, reh'g granted, 444 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1970); Pierce, supra
note 16, at 66-67 & n.14.
52. One Supreme Court justice referred to early producer regulation as
the Commission's "Sisyphean labors . . . as it marcheld] up the hill of pro-
ducer regulation only to tumble down again with little undertaken and less
done." Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 315 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). The
Court was later to cite descriptions of producer regulation as the "outstanding
example in the federal government of the breakdown of the administrative
process." Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 758 (1968) (citing LAN-
DIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECr, printed for
the use of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 54
(1960) [hereinafter cited as LANDis REPORT]).
53. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1968). See also
Morgan & Patterson, supra note 42, at 109-110.
54. The difficulty of making such estimations and the backlog they cre-
ated was only part of the disadvantage of this method. By setting each pro-
ducer's rate on the basis of cost plus return, the FPC reduced each producer's
incentive to act efficiently. See infra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
55. Morgan & Patterson, supra note 42, at 109-110. In Atlantic Ref. Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 360 U.S. 378, 389, reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 801
(1959), the Court said that individual producer regulation produced delays that
[Vol. 70:61
PRICE ESCALATION CLAUSES
what became known as the "in-line" doctrine: rates were ap-
proved if they were in line with other rates prevailing in the
geographical area.56
In 1960, the FPC began setting batch rates by geographical
areas.57 It considered general or across-the-board producer
costs for each area, reasonable producer returns, and non-cost
elements designed to bring gas to market.58 The area rate pric-
ing methodology also introduced the concept of "vintaging," or
natural gas pricing that included reference to historical costs.
"Old" or "flowing" gas was assigned a lower price ceiling than
"new" gas, which was thought to be associated with both higher
costs of production and greater need for incentives to stimulate
exploration and development of new supplies.59 Eventually, in
1968, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's first effort
at what the Court called the "experiment" of area rate setting
in the landmark Permian Basin Area Rate Cases.60 The pro-
cess, however, had lasted almost a decade, during which price
ceilings had remained uncertain.
Serious signs of regulatory failure began to appear soon af-
ter Permian. In 1969, an FPC staff report predicted impending
appeared "nigh interminable." See also McFarland, Landis' Report: The Voice
of One Crying in the Wilderness, 47 VA. L. REV. 373, 374-415 (1961) (reviewing
LANDIs REPORT, supra note 52).
56. Statement of Gen. Policy No. 61-1, 18 C.F.R. § 2.56, 24 F.P.C. 818
(1960). See Morgan & Patterson, supra note 42, at 110.
57. Area Rate Proceeding No. AR 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 1121, 1124 (1960).
58. See generally Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases, 428 F.2d 407, 417
n.5 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
59. In the Permian Basin cases, for example, the FPC set a lower rate for
gas produced from wells dedicated to interstate commerce before January 1,
1961, and for associated gas (or gas produced in association with oil, which was
considered to require lower production costs). The other vintage, with higher
rates, was for gas produced from wells dedicated after January 1, 1961. Per-
mian Basin, 390 U.S. at 759-60. In the Southern Louisiana proceeding, three
different vintages were established. Southern Louisiana, 428 F.2d at 419-20.
Regulation pursuant to the NGPA has resulted in more than thirty different
categories or vintages.
There is, of course, no physical difference between "new" gas and "old"
gas. Gas is gas, and if a molecule of "old" gas meets a molecule of "new" gas at
the burner tip, each produces the same result. Furthermore, both have the
same value. The artificial distinction created by vintaging is dysfunctional in
many ways. The economic difficulties with vintaging include failure to ration
demand, creation of the perception in producers of new gas that their gas is
subject to the risk of vintaging, and discouragement of enhanced production
from old wells. The FPC at one point announced an intention to phase out all
vintaging. Statement of Gen. Policy No. 61-1, 18 C.F.R. § 2.56, 24 F.P.C. 818
(1960). However, it retained the concept in later proceedings.
60. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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natural gas shortages. 61 In 1970, in the Southern Louisiana
Area Rate Cases,62 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the second area
rate proceeding to reach the appellate courts, but noted that it
did so because it was constrained by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Permian. The Fifth Circuit also criticized the Commis-
sion for failing to insure that adequate gas supply would reach
the market, and it pointedly accused the Commission of
"whistling in the dark. ' 63 The Commission responded by re-
opening its proceedings in the case.64
In the early 1970's, the OPEC oil embargo was accompa-
nied by severe winters and by shortages of natural gas.6 5 In re-
sponse, the FPC allowed special incentive prices which were
higher than otherwise applicable area rates.66 Finally, the
Commission abandoned its efforts to regulate by area rates, and
instead adopted national price ceilings for different categories
of gas.67
61. FPC, STAFF REPORT ON NATIONAL GAS SUPPLY AND DEMAND 1, 4, 11,
19 (1969).
62. 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
63. Id. at 444.
64. Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceedings, 46 F.P.C. 86, clarified 46
F.P.C. 633 (1971), affd sub nom Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.
1973), affd sub nom. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283 (1974).
65. See MacAvoy, supra note 42, at 67-68; Morgan & Patterson, supra note
42, at 112; Nordhaus, supra note 42, at 836-841; Pierce, supra note 16, at 67-68.
See generally P. STARRATT, supra note 15, at 29-39, 63-65 (arguing that the
shortage was the inevitable result of FPC price regulation).
66. For example, the Commission attempted to exempt "small" producers
from price ceilings. Order 428, 45 F.P.C. 454 (1971). This order was reversed
because it did not require small producer rates to be just and reasonable. Tex-
aco, Inc. v. FPC, 474 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1972), affd, 417 U.S. 380 (1974); see
Nordhaus, supra note 42, at 838-40. Treatment of short-term emergency
purchase rates met with mixed results in the courts and poor response from
producers. Id. The Commission did successfully impose a "small producer
rate," which increased ceilings to 130% of the otherwise binding maximum
price. Small Producer Regulation, Opinion 742, 54 F.P.C. 853, 856-58 (1975).
The FPC also created an apparatus for regulating gas curtailments. FPC
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 626-29 (1972) (FPC has power to
regulate interstate sales of gas under its transportation jurisdiction); see Mor-
gan & Patterson, supra note 42, at 113-14.
67. See Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas,
Opinion 669, 51 F.P.C. 2212, 2215 (1974). The Commission's authority to set
such rates was upheld in Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061, 1073-74 (5th Cir.
1975), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
The second round of "national area rates" was also upheld in American
Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016, 1061-64 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied,
435 U.S. 907 (1978). In this second set of proceedings, the FPC took account of
recent costs, declining discovery rates, and discounted cash flow; as a result,
the second set of prices was double those of the first set. Morgan & Patterson,
supra note 42, at 112.
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The winter of 1976-77 was unusually severe, and it resulted
in natural gas curtailments, layoffs, and seventy-five deaths at-
tributed to gas shortages. 68 The shortages were recognized as
the product of three problems in the regulatory system.69 First,
prices were inadequate to call forth sufficient supply from pro-
ducers. Second, since only the interstate market was regulated,
producers were prompted to dedicate gas for sale within the
state in which it was produced, rather than to the interstate
market. Thus, consuming states had inexpensive gas but inade-
quate supply, while producing states ironically had gas that cost
more but was plentiful. Furthermore, a plentiful supply of gas
created a flight of people and industry from consuming states
to producing states. Third, and finally, artificially suppressed
prices stimulated consumption and discouraged conservation.70
In 1978 Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy Act
(NGPA)71 in an attempt to deal with these problems. The
NGPA represented a compromise between forces advocating
deregulation and those advocating continued controls.7 2 It ex-
tended regulation to the intrastate market for the first time.7 3
It divided gas into categories defined by well dates, dedication
to interstate commerce, formations, and other factors. "High-
cost" natural gas in formations or at depths making it expen-
68. Pierce, supra note 16, at 67 n.18.
69. See EXECUTWE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN
50-53 (1977). See generally P. STARRATr, supra note 15, at 29-39, 63-65.
70. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
71. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3372 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432
(1982)).
72. The Pearson-Bentsen proposal, S. 2310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121
CONG. REC. 33,657 (1975) had passed the Senate, but the companion House bill,
H.R. 9464, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), failed to pass. The Pearson-Bentsen
Bill proposed to deregulate new natural gas. No deregulatory legislation was
passed in 1976 or 1977, although the Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-2 §§ 1-14, 91 Stat. 4-10 (1977), (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 717
(1982)), authorized the President to create a complex scheme of incentive
rates. Nordhaus, supra note 42, at 840-47.
In 1977, the House reported a bill similar to the President's proposal, de-
feating deregulation attempts. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R.
REP. No. 496, 95th Cong., 1st Sss. 95, 98-101 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 8454, 8539, 8542-45. In the Senate, the Pearson-Bent-
sen proposal was reconsidered and passed in an amended form after a vituper-
ative floor debate. S. 2104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REC. 32,284 (1977);
S. REP. No. 436, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The NGPA resulted from more
than a year's consideration of these two totally different bills by House and
Senate conferees. S. REP. No. 1126, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). See Morgan &
Patterson, supra note 42, at 114-15.
73. NGPA § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 3315(a) (1982).
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sive to produce was scheduled for early deregulation,7 4 and
soon began to command increased prices. Price ceilings for
"new" natural gas were determined by a formula that included
both inflation and real increases, 7 5 while different categories of
"old" gas were assigned fixed prices based upon the previous
NGA rates, with adjustments for inflation. 76 Most significantly,
however, new gas was scheduled for ultimate decontrol.77 The
theory underlying the NGPA was that diminishing volumes of
old gas in the national supply, coupled with increasing percent-
ages of new, decontrolled gas would ultimately lead to a func-
tioning market in natural gas that would be largely
unregulated. 78 The NGPA, however, was the product of com-
promise, and it too has been criticized as creating
inefficiencies. 79
This history of regulatory failure contains the seeds of the
present battle over escalation clauses. During times of
shortage, against a backdrop of dwindling reserves, pipelines
were concerned with obtaining adequate long-term supplies of
gas. Accordingly, they were willing to pay ceiling prices and to
enter into long-term contracts with escalation clauses that
would motivate producers.8 0 The deregulation of high-cost gas
in the NGPA, however, showed that although inexpensive gas
was scarce, supplies of more expensive gas were plentiful. In
74. NGPA § 107, 15 U.S.C. § 3317 (1982). High-cost gas categories included
gas produced from depths below 15,000 feet, from geopressured brine, from
coal seams, and from Devonian shale. The FERC has exercised authority to
add designated "tight" formations. See Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 671 F.2d 119,
120-21 (5th Cir. 1982). Section 108 of the NGPA establishes a special ceiling
for stripper well gas. 15 U.S.C. § 3318 (1982).
75. NGPA § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 3312 (1982). The provision sets an April 20,
1977 date for production in commercial quantities as the determinant. The
well must also be at least two and one-half miles from an existing well, or
drilled to at least 1000 feet deeper than any well within that distance.
76. Thus, different prices are set for new onshore production wells, or
wells that develop existing fields (section 103); for old gas (section 104); for
"rollover" contract, or renewals of expired contracts (section 106); and for var-
ious categories of other gas (section 109). NGPA §§ 103, 104, 106, 109, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3313-14, 3316, 3319 (1982).
77. NGPA § 121, 15 U.S.C. § 3331 (1982).
78. See Pierce, supra note 16, at 89.
79. See Pierce, supra note 8, at 349.
80. See id at 353-57; Natural Gas Regulation, supra note 2, at 636-38. One
reason for this behavior was that curtailments created enormous potential lia-
bility for pipelines. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.,
Nos. 575-544, 479-040 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1984) (awarding damages of more
than $85 million in curtailment-related suit), summarized in FOSTER NAT. GAS
REP. No. 1482, Sept. 6, 1984, at 1.
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addition, higher prices led consumers to conserve gas or switch
to alternative energy sources, and this response reduced de-
mand. The result is that in recent years the market has pro-
duced an oversupply or "bubble"8' of natural gas. Pipelines
that agreed to escalation clauses when they contracted for large
volumes of new gas have sometimes found themselves unable
to market it. 8 2 These circumstances have placed pressure on
some pipelines to avoid the payment of escalated prices, while
producers have naturally resisted these efforts.8 3 The resulting
conflict has led to disputes over the justification for price esca-
lation clauses, which is the subject of the next section of this
Article.
II. THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF
ESCALATION CLAUSES
The economic function of escalation clauses can be illus-
trated by the following simplified example. If a reservoir of a
depletable commodity such as natural gas were to be sold in a
given year (here called "year 1"), for a rate to be paid over fif-
teen years and to be computed by reference to the market
price, the seller would receive payments somewhat as follows:
81. "There is little doubt that there is now a 'gas glut' in that more gas
can be delivered to purchasers than they are willing to buy at currently pre-
vailing prices." Natural Gas Regulation, supra note 2, at 637-38. See FOSTER
NAT. GAS REP. No. 1470, June 14, 1984, at 10 (reporting AGA estimate of the
bubble at 2.3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) within the continental United States in
1984).
82. This difficulty was exacerbated when prices approached fuel oil levels.
See Natural Gas Regulation, supra note 2, at 619; FOSTER NAT. GAS REP. No.
1395, Dec. 29, 1982, at 9; FOSTER NAT. GAS REP. No. 1376, Aug. 12, 1982, at 2.
One pipeline reported the loss of two-thirds of its jurisdictional sales owing to
fuel oil substitution and similar market effects. FOSTER NAT. GAS REP. No.
1394, Dec. 16, 1982, at 19.
83. See infra notes 238-289 and accompanying text.
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AND LOW INITIAL RATE:
ANNUAL PAYMENTS GRAPH
year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 15
On the other hand, if it contracted for a constant price, the
seller would demand a much higher initial rate and would re-
ceive payments as follows:8 4
CONSTANT-PRICE CONTRACT PROVIDING
CONSIDERATION EQUIVALENT TO MARKET-
E-1 PRICE CONTRACT: MUCH HIGHER Il
INITIAL PAYMENTS I I
zz
year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 15
The darkened portion of each bar on the second graph repre-
sents the amount by which the constant price would exceed the
market price. The dotted lines which appear in later years rep-
resent the amount by which the constant price would be below
the market price.
Several features of these graphs are noteworthy. First, the
graphs assume an increasing market price for natural gas. Eco-
nomic principles dictate such increases because of the deplet-
84. This graph is simplified for illustrative purposes. Its limitations are
set forth infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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able nature of the resource.8 5 Second, the constant price graph
may understate the payments necessary to provide an
equivalent to the market price graph because a constant price
contract shifts the allocation of risk between the parties, and
principles of economics dictate that this shift must be reflected
in price.8 6 Third, the graphs are equalized in present dollars to
account for the time value of money.8 7 Fourth, both graphs as-
sume that the commodity cannot be purchased except at mar-
ket value. In the long run, this result too is a consequence of
economic principles, because producers cannot be induced to
produce the commodity, as opposed to placing their money else-
where, if prices are below market. Nor can the government ac-
complish that result without dedicating equivalent resources
and therefore paying the equivalent of market value, in the
85. See infra notes 209-213 and accompanying text. Price in a given year
may rise or fall, but the long run trend must be one of increase. Id.
86. See infra notes 105-129 and accompanying text.
87. A payment in 1990, for example, has a present value in 1975 considera-
bly less than that of a payment actually made and received in 1975. In order to
compare the two payments, one must translate the 1990 payment into present
value as of 1975 (or the 1975 payment into present value as of 1990). To do the
former, one may use the formula
PnVn- (1+i)n
Where Vn is the present value of payment P in the nth year and i is a discount
factor that can be approximated by the market rate of interest in the begin-
ning year. Thus, the present value of the estimated total income stream from
the escalating contract must equal the present value of the constant dollar in-
come stream, or
= C(1+i)n (1+i)n
where C is the level of the constant price. See J. GRIFFIN & H. STEELE, EN-
ERGY ECONOMICS & PoLicY 66 (1980).
The charts, rather than attempting to reflect actual dollars for each year,
simply assume that a present value multiplier has been applied to obtain eas-
ier comparisons.
This consideration of time-value theory provides the basis for one justifi-
cation of escalators. In part, the 1990 payment is significantly higher because
1990 dollars are worth significantly less than 1975 dollars. The tendency of the
purchaser to complain in 1990 that his then-current payment far exceeds his
initial payment is simply misplaced. He has obtained the use of the difference
between his 1975 payment and a fair constant-level price (plus the sum of such
differences for all early payments) and has been able to invest it or use it.
Conversely, the producer, when he contracts in 1975, must discount the 1990
payment, which is worth less to him. The failure to consider the impact of
time on costs and markets has been a frequent source of difficulty in natural
gas regulation.
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form of tax dollars.8 8
Finally, it is apparent that the market-price graph, rather
than the constant-price graph, is the one that corresponds most
closely to natural gas contracts with escalation clauses. Con-
tract price and market price may not be identical, because the
index used may lag below or rise above market price from time
to time, but a contract with an escalation clause will follow the
market in a rough way.8 9 Both graphs reflect payment of mar-
ket price over the life of the contract. The escalating price,
however, roughly corresponds to the market price throughout
the term of the contract. Thus, to ask whether escalation
clauses are consistent with public policy is, in essence, to ask
whether it is desirable for contract prices to follow market
levels.
A. SUPPLY, DEMAND, AND PRICE IN A MARKET ECONOMY
A rise in market price is a signal to entrepreneurs to invest
capital in the production of the commodity whose price is ris-
ing.90 At the same time, a rise in price is a signal to consumers
to reduce consumption or seek substitute fuels. If price is arti-
ficially depressed by decisions such as the refusal to allow natu-
ral gas prices to rise to market levels, the market sends
misleading signals to both producers and consumers. Producers
put fewer resources into production, abandon properties that
they would not abandon if the market were functioning prop-
erly, refrain from utilizing more expensive secondary and terti-
ary recovery techniques, and generally produce less.
Consumption, on the other hand, is subsidized, and demand in-
creases above market levels.9 1 The end result of this excess of
demand over production, in the long run, is shortages of natu-
ral gas.92
The following graph, adapted from an economist's standard
chart, illustrates the law of supply and demand for the energy
88. Were it to compensate producers for below market prices, the govern-
ment would have to dedicate resources of a value equivalent to market value
because each factor of production must be compensated in proportion to its
marginal productivity, and because the paper upon which money is printed
does not have intrinsic value but is only a medium of exchange. See R. DORF-
MAN, PRICES AND MARKETS 93-94 (3d ed. 1978).
89. See infra notes 207-211 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
91. This result follows even if the commodity, like natural gas, is a deplet-
able resource that needs to be conserved. See infra notes 187-190 & 196-197
and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
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0 ~excess supply/
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QUANTITY, Millions of units
Point P is the "equilibrium point" where supply equals de-
mand, here at $25 per unit. If price rises above the equilibrium
point, "excess capacity" is created.94 Thus, at the higher price
of $30, producers' output is twenty million units, but consumers
will accept only ten million; thus the excess capacity (here rep-
resented by the distance from point A to point B) is ten million
units. Given such a situation, economists generally agree that
firms will feel pressure to reduce inventory by cutting prices.9 5
Lower prices will also increase consumer demand, and bring
supply and demand closer to equilibrium.
A regulatory ceiling set below market levels, however, pre-
93. See, e.g., H. MERKLEIN & W. HARDY, ENERGY EcoNoMics 22 (1977).
See generally J. GRIFFIN & H. STEELE, ENERGY ECONOMICS AND PoLIcY 33-89
(1980) (discussing criteria for efficient energy allocation and showing several
supply and demand schedules for energy).
94. H. MERKLEIN & W. HARDY, supra note 93, at 22. See also P. SAMUEL-
SON, ECONOMIcS 62-67 (6th ed. 1964). Professor Paul Samuelson explains that
at a price above equilibrium, "[t]he rise in market price [is] the signal to coax
out a higher supply .... It [is] the signal for [people] and other scarce re-
sources to move into the production industry from alternative uses." Id at 67.
It is likewise, as Samuelson shows, the signal to consumers to conserve. I&L at
60-61.
95. See, e.g., H. MERKLEIN & W. HARDY, supra note 93, at 23.
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vents the market from balancing supply and demand. The dys-
functional result of this regulation can be depicted as follows: 96
34 S
P.
25 p
0
x Y
S20
94ShorgeD
11 15 19
QUANTITY, Millions of units
A market functioning normally would reach equilibrium at
point P, where the supply and demand curves intersect. This
graph assumes, however, that regulatory policy requires gas to
be sold at below-market prices. As a result, demand exceeds
supply and there is a shortage (here represented by the dis-
tance from point X to point Y). In a graph depicting the natu-
ral gas market during the 1970's, such a shortage would
represent spot sales at above-market prices, service interrup-
tions, and the flight of people and industry to the producing
states where plentiful gas was available in the unregulated in-
trastate market.
Similar effects result whenever the price of any commodity
is artificially held below market. 97 Thus Professor Paul Samu-
96. H. MERKLEIN & W. HARDY, supra note 93, at 22-24. The graph hap-
pens to be one depicting the result of domestic crude oil price regulation, and
the shortage represents the amount of imported oil necessary to fill the gap.
Id. at 28-30. Some economic texts give slightly different and more complex
treatment of the natural gas market, since pipeline limitations and long-term
contracts distribute welfare gains differently than in the oil market, see infra
note 101 and authorities cited therein, but the basic principle remains the same
in both markets, and the long term result is similar.
97. See P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 64-66, 391-92 (12th ed.
1985) (using domestic oil price regulation and resulting shortages as example);
see also Ringleb, supra note 42, at 727 n.94 (graph showing supply, demand,
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elson uses an identical graph depicting the sugar market to il-
lustrate these principles. Samuelson hypothesizes that the
government intervenes to hold prices below market because
"high prices would have contributed to 'profiteering' in that in-
dustry.... So go the arguments of would-be price fixers. 9 8
Samuelson details the unhappy results of such regulation:
At the legal ceiling price, supply and demand do not match. Con-
sumers want thousands of pounds of sugar in excess of what produ-
cers are willing to supply....
... There follows a period of frustration and shortage ....
The price mechanism is stymied and blocked. Nonmonetary con-
siderations must determine who is the lucky buyer and who the un-
lucky one: the warmth of the smile that the customer flashes on the
grocer... or the accident of being in the store when the sugar is put
on the shelves.
Nobody is happy .... It is no wonder that black markets occa-
sionally develop....
If for political or social reasons market price is not to be permit-
ted to rise high enough to bring demand down to the level of supply,
the only solution under these circumstances lies in outright coupon,
or point, rationing.
9 9
Samuelson concludes that "[a]ny haphazard interference with
competitive supply and demand is likely-save in same excep-
tional circumstances-to be a bad rather than a good thing."10 0
The above analysis represents a broad consensus. Other
economic texts include treatments of the subject that are func-
tionally identical. 10 1 Furthermore, the inconveniences associ-
ated with shortages are not the only result of artificially
and shortage identical to graph in H. MERKLEIN & W. HARDY, supra note 93,
at 22, with additional identification of producer's and consumer's surplus, so-
cial loss, and effective demand price).
98. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 94, at 386-88. These arguments, posited by
Samuelson as hypothetical reasons for controlling sugar prices, are strikingly
similar to those asserted in support of historical natural gas wellhead price
regulation, which the Congress now ultimately seeks to remove. NGPA § 121,
15 U.S.C. 3331 (1982)
99. Id at 387.
100. 1d. at 388.
101. See, e.g., A. ALOHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COM-
PETITION, COORDINATION AND CONTROL 93-98 (2d ed. 1977); J. DARMSTADTER,
CONSERVING ENERGY 81-82 (1975); R. DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 1-25; A. GIT-
LOw, ECONOMICS 361-67 (1962); J. ORR & D. SAVAGE, ECONOMICS IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY 290-92 (1970). For works of energy economists to similar effect, see J.
GRIFFIN & H. STEELE, supra note 93, at 246-49, 251-53; H. MERKLEN & W.
HARDY, supra note 93, at 20-30; P. STARRATT, supra note 15, at 37-38. Profes-
sors Steele and Griffin argue that the welfare losses are differently distributed
in oil markets and gas markets owing to delivery differences, and they use dif-
ferent graphs in the case of natural gas to show short-term gains to some con-
sumers and losses to others. J. GRIFFIN & H. STEELE, supra note 93, at 246-49.
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depressed prices. Welfare losses'0 2 in the natural gas market
are significant in amount. In 1980, the Department of Energy
estimated welfare losses due to nonproduction of demanded gas
in the range of $2.5 to $5 billion per year.10 3 Additional losses,
owing to misallocation among consumers, would increase these
figures.' °4 None of these estimates, however, can adequately
reflect human costs of dislocations such as plant closings or
population migration.10 5
B. THE EFFECT OF RISK ON PRICES
The concern over misallocation of resources is not the only
argument supporting escalation clauses. In fact, escalators in-
crease economic efficiency in a more direct way. A producer
locked into a long-term, constant-price contract runs the entire
risk that the market price will rise more quickly than antici-
pated, in which case the constant price will be less than the
market value of the producer's gas.106 The use of an escalator
divides this risk between the purchaser and the producer.
Since entrepreneurial risk-taking is itself a factor of production
102. Welfare losses stem from two sources: first, inefficiency caused by the
failure to produce gas whose value exceeds its cost, and second, misallocation
among consumers; see Ringleb, supra note 42, at 727-30 and infra notes 103-
104; see also Pierce, supra note 16, at 70-72.
103. See Pierce, supra note 16 at 70-71 (citing DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, RE-
DUCING U.S. OIL VuLNERABLrY II-B-27 (1980) and W. LOURY, AN ANALYSIS
OF THE EFFICIENCY AND INFLATIONARY IMPACT OF THE DECONTROL OF NATU-
RAL GAs PRicEs 10 (1981)). Loury's estimate of welfare losses due to nonpro-
duction of demanded natural gas is $4.15 to $4.96 billion.
104. These losses were estimated at $1 billion per year in 1980. See Pierce,
supra note 16, at 72 (citing P. MERRILL, THE REGULATION AND DEREGULATION
OF NATURAL GAS IN THE U.S. (1938-1985) (Energy & Environmental Policy
Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Discus-
sion Paper E-80-13, 1981)).
105. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text; see also P. STARRATr,
supra note 15, at 7-8, 66-68; Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 15, at 90.
106. See Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 549 F. Supp. 463 (D.
Colo. 1982), affd, 758 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985).
Without such a clause, the producer is in effect being asked to assume
one hundred percent of the risk of the contract. That is a risk the
producer will want to be compensated for in terms of a significantly
higher contract price from the very beginning.
I&L at 471; cf. Pierce, supra note 16, at 81, 94 (arguing that indefinite escalation
clauses suggest purchaser has agreed to assume risk of price increases; how-
ever, fixed escalation clauses are completely ineffective under deregulation
and indicate that the producer has assumed the risk of price increases because
they dramatically understate the market price for gas).
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that must be adequately compensated,10 7 a constant price con-
tract would not merely require overall prices that would equal
indexed prices in present-value dollars. To compensate for the
producer's risk, the constant price would have to exceed the to-
tal cost of an indexed contract. 08 An escalation clause thus
reduces the total contract price required to induce the producer
to furnish the necessary supply.
Commentators have noted empirical evidence of this phe-
nomenon. Professor Paul MacAvoy, in a study of long-term
contract pricing terms, concluded that "prices were signifi-
cantly higher for ... [longer term] contracts" but that
"[c]ontracts with [escalators] had significantly lower prices than
those without [them]."' 09 Another commentator points out that
the parties "trade price increases [initially] for ... certain con-
tract clauses," and that these clauses are "as much a part of the
total consideration" as the initial contract price.- 0
Natural gas is not unique in this respect. Many commodi-
ties that are sold in long-term contracts are sold by indexed
prices. Variable rate mortgages, for example, are functionally
indistinguishable from natural gas price escalation clauses.'-"
Many sellers of mortgage money (lenders) will not take the
risk of lending at a constant rate in a fluctuating market unless
the constant rate is set unaffordably high.1 2 Floating interest
107. [R]isk introduces a new element of cost .... Because most peo-
ple are reluctant to assume risks, the cost of venture capital is higher
than the cost of riskfree capital.
We have now come across a new "factor of production," willing-
ness to expose capital to risk. Like other factors, it is scarce and must
be allocated.
R. DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 245; see also P. SAMUELSON & W. NoRDHAus,
supra note 97, at 661.
108. See P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAus, supra note 97, at 661; see also Su-
perior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 549 F. Supp. 463, 471 (D. Colo. 1982)
(applying concept of compensating entrepreneurial risk-takers to natural gas
contract), affd, 758 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985). Cf. Southern Louisiana Area
Rate Cases, 428 F.2d 407, 424, 442 (5th Cir. 1970) (high rates of return are justi-
fied because of the high risks involved in gas exploration; because discovery of
new natural gas supplies is dependent upon risk-taking entrepreneurs invest-
ing in gas produdtion, regulation of the industry should consider the availabil-
ity and sources of capital as well as the number of entrepreneurs who will be
dissuaded from investing as a result of the regulations).
109. P. MACAVOY, PRICE FORMATION IN NATURAL GAS FIELDs 236-37
(1962).
110. E. NEUNER, supra note 1, at 266-69.
111. See D. CRUMP & J. CURTIS, THE ANATOMY OF A REAL PROPERTY
TRANSACTION 19-20, 31-34 (1984).
112. Id. The differential between adjustable rate and fixed rate mortgages
exceeded five percent of the rate during 1984 in many locations. This differ-
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rates indexed to the prime rate have been in use in commercial
transactions for many years.1 3 Similarly, many long-term
leases of commercial office space contain escalation clauses."14
Other energy resources sold on long-term contracts, such as
coal and uranium, use indexed prices.115 Recently, even con-
tracts for the services of professional athletes over multiple
years have included provisions similar to favored nations
clauses." 6
Risk also enters into natural gas pricing through regulatory
uncertainty. Some regulatory policies have the effect, if not the
design, of frustrating legitimate contract expectations. For ex-
ample, vintaging"17 is designed to reduce prices for gas in which
producers have already invested, on the theory that higher
prices are not necessary to prompt them to produce, while
newer supply requires "incentive prices." The producers of
newer gas, however, are certainly aware that their production
may also be vintaged; thus the frustration of old gas producers'
expectations may cause new gas producers to demand a pre-
mium as compensation for the risk of vintaged prices.
One commentator states the proposition thus:
The point is a simple one: there is no way to obtain capital fi-
nancing for a utility at less than the market valuation of the corre-
sponding risk. Regulated industries not only face risks similar to
those faced by other industrials; they also confront risk associated
with nonresponsive pricing. Regulatory commissions traditionally re-
spond either by paying the investor a premium for the risk or by ig-
noring the increased risk and letting the capital market adjust o the
stock and bond prices to reflect the risk. In either event, the utility
customer ultimately bears the increased capital costs ... or faces de-
clining service because no capital will be available for modernization
ence represents the lender's risk premium associated with the fixed rate
mortgage.
113. See Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 605 F. Supp. 592, 595-96
(D. Ore. 1985) (jury verdict finding antitrust violations from defendant's use of
national prime bank lending rate set aside and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict entered for defendant).
114. The index may be tied to various kinds of factors including indicia of
market levels, such as tenants' sales.
115. Favored nations clauses are commonly used in contracts for these
commodities. For an example of a typical favored nations clause, see E.I. Du-
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1984) (reversing
FTC ruling prohibiting use of favored nations clauses in gasoline-additive sales
contracts).
116. See, e.g., Houston Chronicle, June 10, 1983, sec. 2, at 1, col. 1 (reporting
that United States Football League's new Houston franchise had contracted
with quarterback Jim Kelly by means of an agreement indexed to other play-
ers' future contracts).
117. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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and new construction.
118
Investment services, such as Standard & Poors, are frank in
stating that "how regulation has responded in the past, how it
sees its responsibilities today, and how it is likely to respond in
the future are directly related to the relative level of credit
quality."' 1 9
For several reasons, the effects of regulatory uncertainty
are exacerbated in the natural gas industry. 20 Large invest-
118. Warren, Regulated Industries' Automatic Cost of Service Adjustment
Causes: Do They Increase or Decrease Cost to the Consumer, 55 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 333, 345 (1980).
119. Fendrich, Utility Rating Criteria, Financial Outlook, and Observa-
tions on Regulation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 4, 1979, at 32 (article by Standard
& Poors Vice President for Corporate Ratings). Graphically, the effect of frus-
trating reasonable expectations can be shown by the following chart. Line A
represents the market-clearing price for natural gas. A period of market price
is followed by a period of price below market (line B) owing to inaccurate in-
terpretation, new regulatory ceilings or contract abrogation.
actualurec Pcee
t °
attract neede or
rel~a neede to -el
p rice A, 
p ate or st, c n
price co ~ n e con trolBincrease ce e ao -..
caused by abent
contract ---- - - on.....
abrogation Gct ee .
:aX~et p-ice . ,
B price controlled
below market
When the policy is lifted, price cannot be expected to go to level C, where it
would have been in the absence of below-market pricing. Instead, greater-
than-normal capital must be attracted to compensate for deferred investment,
causing an increment to the level represented by D. But even that level will
not attract capital, because investors, newly aware of the risk of nonresponsive
regulation, will extract a premium for that risk. Thus, the price to attract new
capital is actually higher still, at point E. See, e.g., W. NICHOLSON, INTERMEDI-
ATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION 297-300 (2d ed. 1979) (noting that
price ceilings block the market's adjustment mechanism).
120. See supra note 112 (market risks make up more than five percent of
fixed rate mortgages in uncertain eceonomy). The likelihood is that greater
risks in natural gas exploration as compared to mortgage lending lead to a
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ments requiring lengthy lead times are particularly likely to be
deterred by uncertainty.121 Furthermore, industries subject to
frequently changing government regulations, such as the gas in-
dustry,122 experience enhanced uncertainty costs even if the
changes are benign.12 3 Again, these views represent a broad
consensus. For example, Professor John Kenneth Galbraith,
although skeptical of neoclassical economics, wrote in 1973 that
"[t]he contract" in such an industry "is central for the protec-
tion of prices" and that the inability to rely on contracts created
"blackouts and brownouts" and a situation in which, at that
time, "the expansion of the oil industry, though still powerful,
no longer [kept] pace"' 24 with market needs.
Concerns about economic efficiency and protecting contract
expectations are not foreign to natural gas regulation. In
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.2s and
FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co.,' 2 6 the Supreme Court an-
nounced what has become known as the Mobile-Sierra doctrine:
subject to regulatory constraints, natural gas contracts are to be
honored as written between the parties. 2 7 In those cases the
doctrine protected purchasers, 128 but the principle may protect
sellers as well.2 9 The supply and demand, allocation of risk,
greater market risk component. "The evidence seems to show that equity cap-
ital does demand a somewhat higher rate of return where risks are higher-
where firms' fortunes vary wildly, or where profits fluctuate a lot from year to
year." R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRucTURE, CoNDucT AND PERFORm-
ANCE 69 (5th ed. 1982).
121. See P. STARRATr, supra note 15, at 30.
122. See supra notes 42-82 and accompanying text.
123. Dorfman, Transition Costs of Changing Regulations, in ATTACKING
REGULATORY PROBLEMS: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH IN THE 1980's 39, 53 (A.
Ferguson ed. 1981).
124. J.K. GALBRAiTH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 128 (1973). In
an industry with short-term capital requirements, uncertainty is not a deter-
rent to investment, because "if prices become unfavorable, the entrepreneur
can turn promptly ... to the production of something else." I& at 112. But,
in the oil and gas industry, "heavy costs are incurred before there is a saleable
product." Id. at 113. These characteristics require better control over prices,
costs, and consumer and government demand than would be necessary in
other industries. Id- at 112-13.
125. 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
126. 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
127. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344; Sierra, 350 U.S. at 352-53.
128. The cases hold that escalation to regulatory ceilings does not occur ab-
sent contractual authority. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344; Sierra, 350 U.S. at 352-
53.
129. See Opinion 77, 10 F.E.R.C. 1 61,214 (1980) (prices are presumed to es-
calate to NGPA ceilings under area rate clauses because that interpretation
best reflects parties' probable intent); see, e.g., 18 C.F.R. § 270.205(b)(1) (1981),
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and regulatory uncertainty analyses suggest that the policy of
enforcing contracts is economically efficient. Its efficiency de-
pends, however, upon an accurate determination of the intent
of the contracting parties. Furthermore, the analyses indicate
that doctrines abrogating contracts, such as public policy or un-
conscionability, may harm the very interests they were
designed to protect unless they are appropriately limited.
C. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, ENERGY POLICY, AND
POLITICAL FREEDOM
This analysis leads to the conclusion that natural gas con-
tracts indexed to the market result in increased economic effi-
ciency. An efficient economy exhibits several advantages. 130
These advantages include the distribution of goods in a manner
that maximizes consumer satisfaction, 13 ' the allocation of fac-
tors of production to produce the mix of goods and services de-
sired by consumers, 32 and the employment of resources in a
way that tends to maximize society's output.133 Other advan-
tages include innovation that proceeds at a rate chosen by con-
sumers 3 4 and a rate of consumption, as versus saving and
investment, conforming to consumer preferences over time. 135
Efficient markets are the result of millions of individual,
autonomous transactions. Regulatory failures, conversely, rip-
ple through the economy and have unintended effects on ap-
parently unrelated transactions. Such failures reduce economic
efficiency, often in unforeseen ways. The natural gas market is
no exception to this ripple-effect phenomenon.
For example, during the past decade, the federal govern-
ment repeatedly warned that the United States must reduce de-
set forth infra note 256. The same doctrine has sometimes been expressed by
Congress. See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1752, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 8983, 8999 (allowing price set
by contract before date of enactment of NGPA to remain above new gas
price).
130. See R. DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 170-226; P. SAMUELSON & W.
NORDHAus, supra note 97, at 675-95.
131. R. DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 174-75; see also infra notes 230-233 and
accompanying text.
132. R. DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 174-75.
133. Id. at 196-226. This concern is known as aggregative efficiency. Effi-
cient markets cannot alone assure aggregative efficiencies because of
macroeconomic effects and the role of government, but they tend toward it.
Id.
134. Id. at 214-20.
135. Id.
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pendence upon natural gas.1 3 6 Congress went so far as to
outlaw a wide spectrum of natural gas uses by statute. 37 Natu-
ral gas price ceilings set below market prices, however, had the
unintentional effect of removing economic incentives for, and
thus postponing, appropriate shifts to alternate fuels. Below-
market pricing also discouraged the development of alternate
sources of energy by depressing prices for them as well. Samu-
elson explains this effect as follows:
No market is an island unto itself. When the price of beef rises (be-
cause of, say, hoof and mouth disease abroad), it pulls up the prices of
domestic cowpokes and land needed for expanded domestic beef out-
put. It raises the prices of rival goods like lamb, pork, and chicken
that some demanders will now turn to. It might even lower the wage
at McDonald's.1
38
Thus, the energy policies of the 1970's depressed demand for
coal, uranium, solar energy equipment, discouraged potential
suppliers or developers of these alternative fuels, and reduced
the development of conservation methods.139
Ultimately, such economic inefficiencies impinge upon
political freedom because they require that consumer choices
be governed by an additional regulatory apparatus. 40 The
United States, in fact, set up such a system in the 1970's in the
form of regulation of home applicances, temperature controls
for buildings, prohibition of certain uses of gas, and similar
measures. The regulatory apparatus was gargantuan in scope:
2,800,000 buildings were subjected to federal temperature con-
trols, and proposed home appliance regulations were over 3,000
pages long and cost $8.5 million to write.141
Such systems require large specialized bureaucracies, allo-
cate resources inefficiently because creation of a sufficient
136. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, REDUCING U.S. OIL DEPENDENCY: ENERGY
POLICY FOR THE 1980's 1 (1980); DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ENERGY
PLAN II 2 (1979); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY IN TRANSITION 1985-
2010 23 (1979).
137. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92
Stat. 3291 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (1982)). The Act prohibits new
uses of natural gas as a boiler fuel following 1990 and limits its use before that
time.
138. P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 97, at 70.
139. J. GRIFFIN & H. STEELE, supra note 93, at 252-54.
140. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 272 (1971). "A ... significant ad-
vantage of a market system is that ... it is consistent with equal liberties and
fair equality of opportunity.... There is no reason at all for the forced and
central direction of labor." Id
141. Reese & Buckley, A Tale of Regulation, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 2, 1981, at 31
(appliances); Houston Chronicle, Feb. 18, 1981, § 1, at 12, col. 1 (building con-
trols); id. Jan. 14, 1981, § 1, at 12, col. 1.
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number of exceptions is a practical impossibility, 142 and inter-
fere with the freedom of producers and consumers to structure
transactions as they choose.143 For example, the Federal
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 197814 addresses
the effects of price suppression through direct prohibitions
upon the burning of gas for certain purposes. Recent efforts to
repeal the Act have been supported in Congress by worst-case
estimates that, by the year 2000, the Act will have cost $44 bil-
lion in unnecessary capital investment or will have resulted in
the loss of 1.5 million jobs.145
In the absence of market allocation, the only solution, and
a highly unsatisfactory one, may be an additional layer of regu-
lations, such as the Federal Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act, designed to mitigate the disadvantages of existing regula-
tion. In the process of enacting such compensating regulations,
as one ethical philosopher has put it, "it is hard to see how...
certain aspects of a command society inconsistent with liberty
can be avoided."'146
III. THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST
ESCALATION CLAUSES
Opponents of price escalation clauses employ economic the-
ory and other qualifications and objections to argue that escala-
tion clauses should not be enforced, and these arguments are
the subject of this section of the Article. Economically-based
arguments concerning alleged failures of competition; economic
rents or "windfall" profits; preference for historical cost of pro-
duction rather than market price as the measure of appropriate
rates; price inelasticity; pipelines' lack of incentive to be eco-
nomically efficient; inappropriateness of methods used for in-
dexing; lack of purchaser incentives toward efficiency; and
failure of the market to achieve distributive justice have all
been advanced as reasons for avoiding escalation. This portion
142. For instance, temperature controls ironically resulted in the waste of
fuel in some buildings. Houston Chronicle, Feb. 18, 1981, § 1, at 12, col. 1; See
also infra note 145 and accompanying text.
143. For example, building controls would interfere with the freedom of an
individual willing to trade other articles of consumption for the temperature
of his preference. The controls would prevent him from arranging to pay an
increment in rent to his willing landlord commensurate with the cost of the
temperature adjustments.
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (1982).
145. See FOSTER NAT. GAs REP. No. 1515, May 2, 1985, at 1.
146. J. RAwLS, supra note 140, at 272.
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of the Article suggests that these arguments do not support the
abolition of escalation clauses although they may, and in some
instances should, affect their interpretation.
A. COMPETITION, COLLUSION, AND MONOPOLY PRICES
The NGA was based upon an FTC report concerning
abuses of natural monopoly in the gas industry.147 The report
dealt with pipelines, which were indeed natural monopolies at
that time,148 but in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin 49 the
Supreme Court interpreted the Act to cover producers as
well.1 50 In the resultant confusion, the monopoly argument has
been extended to producers as well as to pipelines.151 This ar-
gument cannot be justified because barriers to entry in the pro-
duction of natural gas are relatively low, drilling ventures are
formed by groups of comparatively small firms, there is a fringe
of marginal operators, and the field price market is
competitive.152
The view that natural gas production is a competitive in-
dustry is generally shared "by economists specializing in energy
markets, such as Professors Adelman, Hawkins, MacAvoy, and
Russell,' u5 3 as well as others. Melvin Laird writes that:
First, with regard to market concentration of the producers, natural
gas supply is one of the least concentrated natural resources indus-
tries in the country. The largest ten firms account for less than 40
percent of the market, and small independent wildcatters abound.154
Even writers supporting regulation concede that "energy sup-
ply industries are not overly concentrated."'' 55
Sometimes, monopoly arguments are based on the premise
that even though natural gas extraction is not a concentrated
industry, it nevertheless functions as one, because producers
147. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
148. FTC REPORT, supra note 43, at 28. Even in the pipeline industry, one
may be skeptical today of regulation based upon monopoly concerns, because
the industry has changed dramatically. See Pierce, supra note 79, at 346.
149. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
150. Id. at 677; see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
151. Phillips was based in part upon the economically unsound proposition
that regulating independent producers was essentially no different from regu-
lating pipelines. Phillips, 347 U.S. at 681-84.
152. For an excellent analysis of the monopoly argument, including a de-
tailed refutation based upon structure, conduct, and performance data, see J.
GRIFFIN & H. STEELE, supra note 93, at 253-70.
153. Mitchell, U.S. Energy Policy: A Primer, in PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. EN-
ERGY POLICY 1, 67 (1976).
154. M. LAIRD, ENERGY-A CRISIS IN PUBLIC POLICY 7 (1977).
155. THE FORD FOUNDATION, A TIME TO CHOOSE 232 (1974).
[Vol. 70:61
PRICE ESCALATION CLAUSES
operate as a cartel.156 As support for the cartel argument, pro-
ponents refer to the size of some energy producers, make alle-
gations of collusion among producers, and point out that
producers have refrained from production until prices rose. 5 7
Closer examination, however, reveals that the cartel argument
is unsound. As mentioned previously, the ten largest natural
gas producers account for less than forty percent of the market,
and independent wildcatters abound.158 Given the unconcen-
trated structure of the natural gas industry,15 9 cartel mainte-
nance would be extraordinarily difficult, 160 and the cartel
theory is refuted by the responsiveness of producers to changes
in the market. Finally, the argument that nonproduction be-
cause of inadequate price is somehow improper, or indicative of
monopoly, is baffling. Nonproduction is precisely the behavior
that would be expected in a competitive industry in which the
government regulates prices below market. 16 1 In the absence
of actual evidence of collusion in a given market, the monopoly
and cartel arguments cannot support the refusal to enforce
price escalation clauses.
B. ECONOMIC RENTS
Rent, to an economist, is the premium paid to the holder of
a factor of production owing to its limited supply.162 A land-
owner who unexpectedly discovers that her property is more
valuable than she believed, because of the presence of recover-
able oil and gas, is paid economic rent.1 63 Payments of rent do
156. See J. GRIFFIN & H. STEELE, supra note 93, at 253-70.
157. 1d.
158. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
159. Thus, many economists believe that, even in a concentrated industry,
the presence of only a few independent competitors can mean vigorous compe-
tition. E.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx 103-04 (1978); Oppenheim, The
Sherman Act and Internal Company Growth, in NAT'L INDUSTRIAL CONFER-
ENCE BD., CONFERENCE ON ANTITRUST IN AN EXPANDING ECONOMY 11 (1962);
see also Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425, 671-73 (1983) (dissenting op. of Chairman
Miller), rev'd and dissenting op. followed, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
Even the classical view does not consider cartels likely in unconcentrated
industries. E.g., R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 55-
71 (1976); Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 439, 447 (1982).
160. See supra note 152.
161. See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
162. See P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 97, at 603, 914.
163. This statement is true only if the holder of the interest in question has
not herself paid for the interest as a factor of production at market price, i.e.,
in accordance with its marginal productivity. If she has so paid, then the rent
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not increase economic efficiency in production, and, therefore,
economic theory supports taxing them away.164 Proponents of
regulation or taxation of oil and gas translate these ideas into
the rhetoric of "windfall profit."165
Economic rent or windfall profit arguments are not a
sound basis for refusing to enforce escalation clauses, however.
Prohibiting the collection of rent, as opposed to taxing it, sends
a distorted signal to the consumer, who perceives the commod-
ity to be in oversupply.166 Refusal to allow the collection of
economic rents would thus encourage inefficient consumption
of a limited resource. Furthermore, the concept of rent does
not support intervention to limit payments received by produ-
cers because producers may not be the parties receiving rent.
In a country that protects private ownership of oil and gas,167
producers must pay market value for the right to explore for
and produce natural gas.168 Such intervention would therefore
artificially reduce producer incentives, 169 and this effect would
in question has actually been received by her predecessor in title (or by that
person's predecessor in title). It may be difficult to determine who has re-
ceived economic rent, and thus it may be difficult to devise an efficient and
equitable means for taxing it. See P. SAMUELSON & W. NoRDHAus, supra note
97, at 606.
164. Id There are difficulties in practice with this theory, however. See
infra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4986-
4998 (1982); cf. Pierce, supra note 16, at 68-69 (two-tier pricing system designed
to shift windfall profits or rents from producer to consumer).
This concept underlies both vintaging rules and efforts to imply vintaging
in contracts. Id It also underlies some efforts to use the doctrines of public
policy or unconscionability to abrogate natural gas contracts. See Kerr-McGee
Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 624, 634 (D. Wyo. 1980) (denying en-
forcement of third party favored nations clause because of alleged "windfall
profit"), rev'd, 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982).
166. Rents do serve the useful function of rationing demand. P. SAMUEL-
SON & W. NoRDHAus, supra note 97, at 607-08. Their disadvantage is that they
do not enhance marginal productivity.
167. Some nations' law provides for common, public ownership of oil and
gas. For example, the Constitution of Mexico provides that "direct [dominion]
of all of the natural resources . . .belongs to the Nation." MEX. CONST. of
1917, art. 27.
168. See Pannill, supra note 42, at 56 (existence of an efficient and secure
economy with a price system that can balance supply and demand serves the
national interest more than an abstract concern over windfall profits); see also
supra note 163.
169. If applied to production from leases that producers might prospec-
tively acquire, a tax would approach more closely in theory the result of re-
moving rents, because it would lower the marginal productivity of mineral
interests and thus lower their market prices (i.e., the tax would be "passed on"
in part to landowners in the form of reduced lease payments). Such a plan
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in turn distort the allocative function of the market. Even if
applied to landowners, this policy would result in regressive
taxation 170 and inequities,'17 and it would fail to achieve the
purpose of eliminating rent unless the landowner subject to tax
had acquired the oil and gas beneath his land for less than its
market value.' 72 In any event, a refusal to enforce escalation
clauses as a means of preventing the receipt of economic rent
or windfall profit by producers is economically unsound.
C. PREFERENCE FOR HISTORICAL COST OF PRODUCTION
RATHER THAN MARKET AS THE BASIS FOR PRICE
Opponents of escalation clauses often argue that escalation
clauses should not be enforced because historical cost of pro-
duction, rather than mar ket value, is the proper determinant of
natural gas prices. 173 If the argument is limited to the proposi-
tion that contract prices are required to remain below regula-
tory price ceilings, which are set in part on the basis of cost
elements, it is obviously legally correct. Contract provisions, in-
cluding escalation clauses, cannot be enforced in contravention
of valid regulatory provisions.
The argument is sometimes made, however, that even if
the contract price would otherwise remain below the applicable
ceiling, the contract should be interpreted to cause prices to
conform to historical costs of production.174 This argument is
untenable. The concept of just and reasonable rates expressed
in the NGA and NGPA is not limited to cost basis. It may be,
and frequently has been, interpreted to include non-cost ele-
would not achieve the result with complete accuracy, however, because of the
difficulty of determining which landowners in the chain of title have actually
received rent. See supra note 163.
170. Its incidence upon those least able to pay would likely be greater as a
percentage of income than its incidence upon those most able to pay. P. SAMU-
ELSON & W. NORDHAus, supra note 97, at 606.
171. The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax, for example, has created certain
inequities by frustrating reliance interests. See Windfall Profit Tax Rips into
Retirees' Income, TEXAs BUSINESS, Oct. 1980, at 8. It has also been the subject
of serious interpretive inconsistencies. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RE-
PORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY: UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE DEFI-
NITION AND SCOPE OF THE PROPERTY CONCEPT MAY REDUCE WINDFALL
PROFIT TAX REVENUES 2, 14 (1982).
172. See supra note 163.
173. E.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 604 F.2d 1281, 1288-89
(10th Cir. 1979) (rejecting implied vintaging). The notion of vintaging itself
makes historical cost one of the elements of regulation. See supra note 59.
174. Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 604 F.2d 1281, 1283-85 (10th
Cir. 1979).
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ments associated with bringing gas to market.175 Furthermore,
the NGPA recognizes that, as a general national policy, con-
tracts should be enforced as written if they conform to regula-
tory price ceilings.176
A more subtle argument is based on the conclusion that, in
a competitive market at static equilibrium, price theoretically
equals marginal cost, including reasonable profit as a cost. This
equation is a fundamental principle of economics.177 Opponents
of escalation clauses use this principle to argue that a contract
term providing for prices greater than historic costs of produc-
tion is inefficient and contravenes public policy.
This argument fails to consider, however, that marginal
cost1 78 equals price only if the market is at ideal efficiency, in a
175. This idea was first expressed in the so-called Bluefield-Hope "end re-
sult" test: a regulatory body must consider prices not in the abstract but in
terms of their end result in bringing gas to market. Bluefield Water Works &
Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1924); FPC v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601-02 (1944). "Far-sighted gas rate regu-
lation... will use price as a tool to bring goods to market-to obtain for the
public service the needed amount of gas." Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC,
324 U.S. 581, 612 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
In the modern era, the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 756-
57 (1968), recognized the need for non-cost anaylsis because "[t]he value to the
public of the services they perform is measured by the ... natural gas they
produce, and not by the resources they have expended in its search." Id at
757. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit explicitly upheld the use of non-cost factors
while criticizing the FPC for failing adequately to take market as well as cost
into account in the Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases, 428 F.2d 407, 426,
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970). Finally, in its Opinion 770, 56
F.P.C. 509, 516 (1976), which set the second round of national rates, the FPC
expressly held that, although costs should be a principal component, noncost
factors such as "the price of competitive fuels, the impact upon supply and de-
mand, inflationary pressures, the nation's natural gas shortage, and conserva-
tion. .. ." were also to be considered. Id. at 516. The Commission in Opinion
770 relied not upon historical cost, but on current costs. Manning, supra note
42, at 1092.
The Supreme Court did hold, in response to FPC special programs to alle-
viate shortages, that a market rate resulting from the equivalent of deregula-
tion by exemption cannot be the final measure of [what is] "just and
reasonable" within the meaning of the NGA. The Court, however, did not
prohibit use of market considerations in ratemaking. FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417
U.S. 380, 397 (1974); cf. Consumer Federation v. FPC, 515 F.2d 347, 350 (D.C.
Cir.) (setting aside FPC exemptions of certain pipelines from NGA certifica-
tion requirements because the FPC "stretched" its "narrow" exemption au-
thority and "failed to establish a valid scheme of indirect regulation."), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975).
176. See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
177. See R. DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 38; P. SAMUELSON & W.
NORDHAUS, supra note 97, at 478-79.
178. Marginal cost is defined loosely as the cost of producing the last unit
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static condition of perfect equilibrium.1 7 9 The natural gas in-
dustry has frequently been subjected to regulatory changes, de-
mand shifts, and interfuel substitutions, and can hardly be
expected to have reached stasis. A dynamic market, such as
that in natural gas, will naturally experience transactions in
which both profit and price are above normal levels. This re-
sult is necessary if price is to perform the signalling function of
bringing resources into industries in which demand exceeds
supply.' s0 Furthermore, absent the prospect of return above or
below normal levels, efficient and inefficient firms would fare
equally well, and there would be no incentive for any firm to
attempt to be efficient.' 8 ' The appropriate question, therefore,
is whether the oil and gas extraction industry has earned ab-
normally high profits over the long run. The available empiri-
cal evidence suggests that oil and gas profits have been close to
the average for all manufacturing industries. 8 2
An additional difficulty with basing price on the historical
cost of production is that historical costs cannot be reliably de-
termined in the gas industry and have often been underesti-
mated. In the past, federal regulatory programs attempted to
tie the price of gas to its historical cost of production. This ap-
proach was used in the system of individual producer costs in
the 1950's, and in the systems of area and national batch rates
in the 1960's and 1970's.183 None of these methods proved effec-
tive. Their failure was partly attributed to regulatory lag and
to the inherent fallacy of using historical, as opposed to current
and future, costs.-84 Therefore, the FPC used updated costs in
the second round of national rates.185 The essential reason for
the failure, however, may be that, in the long run, price does
produced. R. DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 50. Mathematically, it is the slope of
the total cost curve plotted against unit cost, or MC(x) = dTC(x)/dx. Id. at 50.
179. Id. at 49; cf. P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 97, at 485-86
(discussing the allocative efficiency of a perfectly competitive market).
180. See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
181. This concern demonstrates one of the fallacies underlying individual
producer regulation on the basis of cost. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS
OF LAW 259-60 (2d ed. 1977).
182. S. REP. No. 394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 147-48, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 551 (chart from Chase Manhattan Bank, showing oil
and gas producers' return on equity to be similar to the average return on eq-
uity of all manufacturing industries and significantly below other industries,
for example, pharmaceuticals; reproduced in statement of Sen. Gravel on
Windfall Profit Tax).
183. See supra notes 42-82 and accompanying text.
184. See R. POSNER, supra note 181, at 257-59.
185. See supra note 175 and authorities cited therein.
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approximate marginal cost in the gas industry, but our eco-
nomic technology does not enable us to measure costs accu-
rately enough to make this determination. 186 In summary, it is
inappropriate to argue that as a matter of public policy escala-
tion clauses should not be enforced because they fail to con-
form to the historical costs of natural gas production.
D. PRICE ELASTICITY
Opponents of escalation clauses sometimes argue or assume
that because energy is a basic necessity, energy demand is in-
elastic and does not respond to price.18 7 This argument is based
upon faulty assumptions regarding price inelasticity and con-
sumer dependence.1 8 8 The evidence shows that both industrial
and residential energy demands are responsive to changes in
price. For example, one commentator's empirically derived de-
mand curve for residential energy consumption shows a de-
crease in demand of eighty percent in response to a doubling of
price. 8 9 Furthermore, a 1980 American Gas Association study
of residential, commercial, and industrial energy consumption
over the previous seven years found significant price-induced
conservation in all three categories. 190
One commentator has identified three responses to a scena-
rio of rising energy costs: behavior modification, modification
of existing energy-consuming equipment, and modification of
186. This conclusion would follow from the competitive structure of the in-
dustry and the absence of abnormal profit. See supra notes 147-161 and accom-
panying text; see also supra note 182.
187. See, e.g., infra note 188.
188. Thus in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 624,
634 (D. Wyo. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989
(1982), the district court computed the impact of an escalation clause by multi-
plying hypothetical existing consumer prices by the rate of increase in the
pipeline's purchase contract and found such prices to be at levels so high that
they were against public policy. Kerr-McGee, 500 F. Supp. at 634. The amicus
curiae brief filed by the Legal Foundation of America indicated that the evi-
dence and standard reference works of which the court could take judicial no-
tice showed only modest price increases. See Brief ,of Amicus Curiae, The
Legal Foundation of America, at 19-21, Kerr-McGee. The reason for the error
was that the district court tacitly assumed price inelasticity and thus failed to
take account of the conservation response of consumers. Id. at 27-30.
189. R. DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 85-86.
190. AMERICAN GAS ASS'N, A SURVEY OF ACTUAL AND PROJECTED CONSER-
VATION IN THE GAS UTILITY INDUSTRY: 1973-1980 (1981), summarized in The
Oil Daily, Mar. 25, 1981, at 5, col. 2. The projected decline in natural gas use
from 1973 to 1980 was 16.2% in residential use, 12.7% in commercial, and 10.8%
in industrial. Id.
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the energy intensiveness of new capital equipment.191 The first
of these responses, behavior modification, produces significant
savings "by turning the dial of a thermostat." Further savings
result from "using the energy-consuming equipment less," such
as by turning the heat off when the building is unoccupied or
by using different amounts of heat in different areas of the
building.192 The second response, the modification of existing
equipment, can lead to further energy savings. An investiga-
tion of a typical furnace shows that "between stack and duct
loss, there is a tremendous amount of energy lost simply be-
cause of non-energy conserving design or poor insulation.' 193
Thus, "the energy intensiveness of a typical house can be de-
creased by about .6 or .7 for a relatively small incremental
cost."'194 Even greater energy efficiency gains can be obtained
by implementing the third strategy and designing new houses
to be energy efficient.195 Similarly, many consumer goods can
be redesigned to use less energy,196 as can many industrial
processes.
When natural gas prices fail to conform to the market,
however, they send a false signal to energy users about the
availability of the resource. The market then fails to trigger
the appropriate consumer response of conservation. If the
cheaply obtainable supply of a commodity is limited, that com-
modity must somehow be allocated. At the very least, policies
should not be adopted that cause the commodity to be inef-
ficiently consumed. The price inelasticity argument is inconsis-
tent with the evidence that indicates that price increases trigger
conservation measures and, in the absence of other politically
acceptable methods of allocation, it is an unsound reason for re-
fusing to enforce price escalation clauses.197
191. Gibbons, The Imperative of Energy Conservation for Economic
Growth, in ENERGY CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIc GROWTH 5, 10-17 (C. Hitch
ed. 1978).
192. Id. at 10-11 (chart showing energy savings as a function of thermostat
settings).
193. Id. at 11. Up to 55% c; the heating value of fuel is unnecessarily
wasted in stack, duct, and related losses.
194. Id- at 15.
195. Id at 17.
196. I& at 16-17.
197. The pricing mechanism for a commodity produced with long-term de-
clining returns to scale, such as natural gas, cannot fulfill its market function
unless price increases in the long run. See infra notes 209-210 and accompany-
ing text.
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E. PIPELINES' INCENTIVE TO MAXIMIZE PROFIT
Another argument advanced in opposition to escalation
clauses is based on the natural gas distribution chain, in which
pipelines purchase from producers for resale to distributors,
who in turn sell gas to ultimate consumers. Pipeline tariffs1 98
allow pipelines to recover their costs of purchasing natural gas
through purchased gas adjustment (PGA) clauses. This recov-
ery is allowed by the NGA in the absence of fraud or abuse.'99
Opponents of escalation clauses argue that, since a pipeline that
receives a return that assertedly does not vary with purchasing
efficiency, the basic economic assumption that profit maximiza-
tion induces efficiency breaks down.200 Therefore, with respect
to pipeline purchases, reliance on market forces or upon escala-
tors that respond to the market is unjustified--or so the argu-
ment goes. As evidence that pipelines lack incentive to
purchase efficiently, opponents point to instances in which
pipelines have agreed to contract adjustments increasing prices
they pay to producers.
The market assumption, however, is that firms maximize
profit in the long run. It is efficient behavior for a natural gas
pipeline to insure long-term supply,20' and in some circum-
stances long-term supply may be enhanced by concessions to
producers. In fact, producers just as frequently make reciprocal
concessions to pipelines for reasons of long-term gain, even
though producers cannot pass along their costs.20 2 Further-
198. "The term tariff .. . means a compilation in a book form of all the
effective rate schedules of a particular natural-gas company, and a copy of
each form of service agreement." 18 C.F.R. § 154.14 (1984).
199. 15 U.S.C. § 3431(c)(2) (1982); Pierce, supra note 16, at 84. The effect
has been criticized as "generally permitting pipelines to operate in what is es-
sentially a cost-plus environment." Natural Gas Regulation, supra note 2, at
629-30.
200. Natural Gas Regulation, supra note 2, at 629-30, 636-38.
201. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
202. [T]he [AGA] study demonstrates that pipelines agree to contrac-
tual modifications not obviously in their immediate interest. A
number of contracts were amended in the period following the relaxa-
tion of producer price ceilings to insert indefinite price-escalation
clauses.
Pierce, supra note 16, at 82. For example, fully 43% of contracts without area
rate clauses were amended to include them. Id The reason for this amend-
ment may be enhanced recovery or bargains struck for new supply from other
wells, or it may be deficiencies in rate design. See infra notes 204-206 and ac-
companying text. It should be noted that producers also make accommoda-
tions to pipelines that are not in the producers' short-term interests but that
are advantageous to them in the long term. Thus, the sinister explanation that
pipelines behave in an inappropriate and purely self-interested manner may
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more, even with the benefit of purchased gas adjustments, pipe-
lines must function with at least minimal efficiency in order to
maximize profit. If they consistently pay too much for the gas
they purchase from producers, they will face deteriorating mar-
kets in the long run. The evidence that some pipelines have al-
ready experienced market resistance, and have in some cases
purchased gas that they have been unable to market, is a mani-
festation of the differences in efficiency among firms.20 3
The total picture, however, is more complex than the above
discussion indicates. Some commentators argue that the regu-
latory system, or the expectation of regulatory bailout in the
event of catastrophe, either leads to inefficient behavior on the
part of pipelines or at least tempers their response to the conse-
quences of inefficient behavior.2 °4 Commentators differ con-
cerning whether the solution to this problem is marginal cost
pricing,20 5 more intense regulation, more selective regulation,
deregulation, or abolition of pipelines as purchasers in favor of
making them common carriers on a contract basis.20 6 The key
not be justified. See infra note 225. For example, one pipeline recently an-
nounced a reduction of its take-or-pay liability by $175 million, accomplished
through compromises with producers. FOSTER NAT. GAs REP. No. 1515, May 2,
1985, at 4.
203. See W. NICHOLSON, supra note 119, at 479-81. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
204. Thus, the use of a rate design that allows "rolled in" pricing, or pric-
ing based upon the weighted average cost of gas (WACOG), encourages pipe-
lines with substantial access to cheaper gas (referred to as a "cushion" of old
or cheap gas) to purchase high-cost gas that they could not sell directly at a
price covering their costs. See Pierce, supra note 8, at 363; see also Pierce, Nat-
ural Gas Rate Design" A Neglected Issue, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1089, 1096-98
(1978).
205. Marginal cost pricing refers to the attribution to each purchase of the
marginal cost associated with it. Thus an electric utility using "time of day"
pricing may charge higher rates at peak usage periods, when generation costs
more. The NGPA provisions for incremental pricing, NGPA §§ 201-08, 15
U.S.C. §§ 3341-48 (1982), were intended to function as a variant of marginal
cost pricing by attributing to lower priority users the highest cost units. These
users, however, tended to be those that could most readily turn to substitutes
such as fuel oil, and the result was loss of load factor and the attribution of
fixed costs in heavier proportion to high-priority residential consumers. Ac-
cordingly, many of FERC's early efforts to implement incremental pricing
were disapproved by congressional veto because of gas oversupply and a deter-
mination that incremental pricing would not achieve policy goals. Morgan &
Patterson, supra note 42, at 131-33.
206. Professor Richard Pierce argues persuasively for pipeline deregula-
tion, noting the growth of the pipeline industry from four to 113 interstate
firms. Service from multiple firms at most locations is generally readily avail-
able; selective regulation of the remaining producers with monopoly positions
could supplement the deregulatory regime. Pierce, supra note 8, at 346, 376-85.
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point, however, is that none of these problems of pipeline rate
design could be solved by refusing to enforce escalation clauses.
Even if pipeline rate design were improved, there would still be
a need for a mechanism to relate prices to increases in market
value in order to induce producers to commit supplies over the
long term. Thus these arguments cannot provide a principled
basis for refusal to enforce escalators.
F. ACCURACY OF THE INDEX: THE "Two-WAY STREET"
ARGUMENT, EFFECTS OF REGULATION, LACK OF
PURCHASER INCENTIVES TOWARD EFFICIENCY,
AND OTHER CRITICISMS
Some criticisms of escalation clauses are based on the as-
sumption that they fail to provide a "two-way street." It is al-
leged that escalation clauses cause prices to rise continuously
and never cause them to decrease.20 7 The short answer to this
argument is that it is incorrect, because some escalation clauses
contain an express provision calling for decreased contract
prices if there is a decrease in the index.20 8 Furthermore, since
the purpose of escalation clauses is to allow contract prices to
follow the market, ambiguous clauses should be interpreted to
allow for decrease with the index.
A more complete explanation, however, is that over the
long term, natural gas prices will inevitably increase-not be-
cause of escalation clauses as such, but because natural gas is a
depletable resource. Natural gas production is an industry
characterized by decreasing returns to scale.20 9 Rather than the
economies of scale that result from increased firm size in most
207. See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 758 F.2d 500, 502-
03 (10th Cir. 1985), (Doyle, J., dissenting) (arguing that escalator should be in-
validated as contravening public policy because "rates will be increased regu-
larly at the behest of utilities. It is very probable that there will never be a
reduction of rates .... ").
208. Thus the criticism expressed by the dissenting judge in Superior Oil
was invalid, to the extent it was based upon this argument, because the clause
there at issue provided for decrease with the index. Superior i4 758 F.2d at
501.
209. See, e.g., R. DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 68-72. The more common situ-
ation of increasing economies of scale produces a long-term cost curve that
gradually decreases. Id at 64-68. The long-term cost curve of a firm facing de-
creasing returns to scale instead resembles an exponential function in its in-
crease. Id at 70 (chart). This increasing cost, which in the gas industry
reflects the sequential exhaustion of cheaply developed reserves and the nec-
essary development of increasingly expensive new ones, must be reflected in
the price if new reserves are indeed to be developed. Actually, even in the ab-
sence of increasing cost, prices must rise owing to the phenomenon of "user
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industries, production of greater and greater volumes of natural
gas causes the next unit to cost more rather than less. Lower-
cost units are produced first, and the price necessary to induce
production of further supply and balance demand is unavoid-
ably higher for later units. Of course, temporary price de-
creases may result from discovery of new fields, technological
advances, interfuel substitutions, or market dislocations due to
excess supply, and these aberrations might produce a saw-
toothed appearance in a graph of market prices for natural gas.
Such short-term swings, however, cannot prevent long-term in-
creases210 as cheaply available reservoirs are exhausted.
Furthermore, the long-term trend of increasing prices can-
not be counteracted by diligent government efforts to hold
prices down. It is impossible to produce natural gas without
committing adequate resources to the effort, and adequate re-
sources will not be committed unless producers receive an ade-
quate price in return. Thus, economic efficiency is maximized
by natural gas prices that follow the long-term increasing
trend.21 ' The economic effects of depletion can no more be
avoided by removing escalation clauses than bad news can be
prevented by killing the messenger. Indeed, any effort to de-
press prices artificially may only make bad news worse by cre-
ating unnecessary shortages, as happened during the severe
winters of the 1970's.212
The complete answer is not so simple, because dysfunc-
tional aspects of the regulatory system sometimes cause inap-
propriate results. For example, the presence of price controls
on regulated gas may temporarily drive unregulated gas to
prices far in excess of market levels, triggering favored nations
clauses that were designed to approximate market levels in-
costs," which reflect the scarcity value of the resource in each period (and
which naturally increase). J. GRIFFIN & H. STEELE, supra note 93, at 67-73.
210. This effect can be avoided only if substitutions, technological change
producing infinite supply, or social change render the commodity valueless.
Otherwise, the effect can be influenced by such factors as changes in the social
rate of discount, revisions in future demand, altered production costs, and
technological change, but prices of a depletable resource must eventually rise.
See J. GRIFFIN & H. STEELE, supra note 93, at 73-87. Indeed, substitutions or
technological change that would reduce or eliminate long-term price increases
are unlikely until and unless price increases make substitution or innovation
economically attractive.
211. If the price for gas from an older, declining well were not to rise with
the market, for example, the producer would be prevented from using en-
hanced recovery to increase production, even though that alternative might be
cheaper than new exploration.
212. See supra notes 13-15 & 65-68 and accompanying text.
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stead.213 Unless the contract compels the conclusion that the
parties intended this result, the favored nations clause should
be construed to conform to its purpose of approximating the
market price.214 Conversely, if the government completely der-
egulates natural gas, the result might be to defeat the intended
function of escalators tied to government-imposed price ceil-
ings, such as area rate clauses.215 At least one commentator has
suggested that, in such a situation, area rate clauses should be
interpreted in accordance with applicable Uniform Commercial
Code provisions that would achieve the parties' intended result
by substituting market-clearing prices for regulated price ceil-
ings.216 This reasoning is sound, both legally and economically.
Another problem with escalation clauses arises when they
are combined with take-or-pay clauses. Take-or-pay clauses re-
quire pipelines to purchase certain volumes of gas per unit of
time or pay for the gas even if they do not take delivery of it.21 7
In the mid-to-late 1970's, many pipelines entered into contracts
containing both escalation clauses and large, fixed take-or-pay
obligations.218 If a high proportion of a pipeline's supply is sub-
ject to take-or-pay, however, and if there is rapid price escala-
213. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
214. This construction could be reached with reasoning similar to that re-
flected infra note 216 and accompanying text if it were concluded that the
price contemplated by the index had thus failed to be set (although that infer-
ence is somewhat more difficult to make in this situation).
215. See Pierce, supra note 16, at 94-96.
216. U.C.C. § 2-305(1)(c) (1977) provides that, if "the price is to be fixed in
terms of some agreed market or other standard as set or recorded by a third
person or agency and it is not so set or recorded", the price is "a reasonable
price at the time of delivery." Such a price has often been held to be the mar-
ket price for the commodity although it may be some other price above or be-
low market depending upon the presence of evidence of intent. Pierce, supra
note 16, at 94-96; see North Cent. Airlines, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 574 F.2d
582, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
217. Pierce, supra note 16, at 78-79; see Natural Gas Regulation, supra note
2, at 626 (defining take-or-pay clauses as requiring the purchaser to pay for a
minimum percentage of the quantity of gas which the seller's wells can physi-
cally produce, regardless of whether the purchaser actually buys the gas). Ad-
ditional issues are created by the interplay between take-or-pay and so-called
"ratable take" rules which require purchasers to take proportionally from all
producers in a field to prevent unfair drainage. Ratable take effectively ex-
tends the purchaser's take or pay obligations to other producers. See Trans-
continental Gas Pipe Line Co. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 457 So. 2d 1298, 1324
(Miss. 1984), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 1840 (1985).
218. Hays & Williamson, Ratable Take, Take-or-Pay, Unilateral Price Ad-
justments, and Unilateral Market Out, in SUING, DEFENDING AND NEGOTIAT-
ING WITH OIL AND GAS PRODUCERS E-1 (State Bar of Texas ed. 1985); Natural
Gas Regulation, supra note 2, at 640.
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tion, serious problems can result.219 Attempts to fix supply,
demand and price by contract for a large number of customers
far into the future will likely have deleterious consequences220
because the pipeline is contractually obligated to purchase large
volumes of gas at high prices even though consumer demand
will be simultaneously decreasing in response to price in-
creases. Thus, at the same time that an escalation clause may
motivate ultimate consumers to conserve and use lesser
amounts of gas, a take-or-pay clause may countermand that
response.
These problems, however, are created by rigid take-or-pay
clauses, and not by escalation clauses as such.221 The problem
is a knotty one, because producers may be dependent upon the
cash flow provided by take-or-pay, and frustration of their reli-
ance interests would create long-term costs; 222 thus, legislation
219. Hays & Williamson, supra note 218, at E-1 to E-2, E-6 to E-14; cf. F.
SCHULLER, TowARD SOLVING THE CONTRACTS PROBLEM: A PUBLIC POLICY
PERSPECTIVE FOR THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 1-3 (Energy & Environmental
Policy Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
Discussion Paper No. E-84-07, 1984) (voluntary compromise between producers
and pipelines is preferable solution to problems caused by take-or-pay con-
tracts and rapid price escalation).
220. In a smaller transaction, in which purchaser and seller agree to a
quantity and a price for goods that are a small portion of the seller's stock and
the purchaser's need, the discrepancy may create no serious difficulty because
over-supply or under-supply can be adjusted with the next transaction. If,
however, the transaction is for the next twenty year's supply of natural gas for
a major metropolitan area, adjustments are more difficult to make.
221. Thus, Professor Richard Pierce points out that the advantages of mar-
ket pricing and contract stability would be destroyed at "enormous cost" by
the elimination of escalators. Producers "would become understandably reluc-
tant to enter into future long-term contracts." Pierce, supra note 16, at 112.
Eliminating take-or-pay through bargaining, judicial relief, or legislative incen-
tives to negotiate would be preferable. Id at 103-04, 111-13; see also F. SCHUL-
LER, supra note 219, at 3, 22-23 (arguing that negotiation is superior to either
legislation or adjudication).
222. In addition, a pipeline's failure to take can in some instances impair
natural gas reservoirs, and loss of cash flow can result in loss of leases (owing
to non-payment of royalty) or loss of other investment. See, e.g., Pogo Produc-
ing Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., No. 84-48823-H (La. Dist. Ct., Feb. 21, 1985),
in FOSTER NAT. GAS REP. No. 1509, Mar. 21, 1985, at 7-8 (temporary injunction
granted enforcing monthly minimum take because shutdown of water-drive
reservoirs "has permanently damaged and will continue to damage the reser-
voirs"); Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 595 F. Supp.
497, 501 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (temporary injunction granted because purchaser's
intended withholding of 20% of 100% allowable take-or-pay would cause irrep-
arable injury by denial of current use of funds by producers for their "substan-
tial investment in deep, extensive gas wells").
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dealing with take-or-pay clauses has proved difficult to draft.223
Increasingly, negotiated or contract solutions, in the form of es-
cape valves known as "market-out" or "economic-out"
clauses,224 have been adopted225 as a means of dealing with the
problems created by take-or-pay. These solutions can be car-
ried out without disturbing the necessary function of escalation
clauses.
G. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Economic texts point out the political attractiveness of as-
223. [Ihe difficulty arises in drafting a suitable market-out provision.
In order to protect producers, the provision must provide reasonable,
objective criteria ... and yet must provide pipelines with some flexi-
bility in making such a determination.... It would seem virtually
impossible to design uniform, national standards for market-out provi-
sions, let alone an actual provision, that could accommodate the wide
range of situations ....
Natural Gas Regulation, supra note 2, at 640.
224. See Hays & Williamson, supra note 218, at E-14. Market-out refers to
language predicated upon the occurrence of named market contingencies,
while economic-out refers to more general language providing flexibility to the
purchaser to determine that resale is not economical. The terms are some-
times used interchangeably, however, and the precise effect of the language
differs from clause to clause. The same result can be obtained by the inclusion
of "partial or entire loss of markets" served by the buyer in the listing of
events of force majeure. See FOSTER NAT. GAS REP. No. 1477, Aug. 2, 1984, at
3.
225. Such negotiations have sometimes been initiated when a pipeline
writes a "take it or leave it" letter. See Hays & Williamson, supra note 218, at
E-15 (showing example of "unilateral price redetermination" or "unilateral
market out" letter). Litigation may follow, and it may precipitate settlement.
Cf. FOSTER NAT. GAS REP. No. 1509, Mar. 21, 1985, at 10 (Numerous pipelines
have filed complaints against producers claiming that take-or-pay payments vi-
olate NGPA ceilings; several of these suits have settled.); FOSTER NAT. GAS
REP. No. 1483, Sept. 13, 1984, at 12 (noting that several suits alleging pipelines'
refusal to make take-or-pay payments are pending in state and federal courts).
A producer has some incentive to negotiate relaxation of take-or-pay lia-
bility for several reasons: pipeline insolvency would result in curtailed pay-
ments; the producer may wish to sell other volumes of gas; the outcome of
litigation is uncertain; litigation is itself slow and expensive; and the pro-
ducer's reputation for fair dealing is important in a business dependent upon
stable long-term relationships. See F. SCHULLER, supra note 219, at 15-16 (sug-
gesting that voluntary compromise is the preferable method for dispute resolu-
tion), see also FOSTER NAT. GAS REP. No. 1515, May 2, 1985, at 4 (reporting
Transco's reduction of its take-or-pay liability by $175 million through com-
promises with producers). Such incentives may provide an incomplete solu-
tion, and it has been argued that legislation to deal with take-or-pay problems
may be desirable. Cf. Pierce, supra note 16, at 103-04, 110-13 (suggesting that
where voluntary modifications in contract behavior offer only an incomplete
solution, a single purpose, narrowly-drawn statute could solve the contractual
problems involved).
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sisting low-income consumers by artificially lowering the price
of a single commodity for the entire population.2 26 The legiti-
mate concern for low-income consumers may thus manifest it-
self in a refusal to enforce escalation clauses as a means of
wealth redistribution. Professor Paul Samuelson argues that
such attempts to redistribute wealth to assist the poor are irra-
tional when accomplished by blockage of the price system:
For example, suppose that 100,000 very wealthy oil drillers sold oil in
competitive markets to 10 million very poor people. Would you be
tempted to say, "Let's control oil prices, not allowing the producers to
get rich at the expense of the poor?". . . Congress took this view, and
domestic oil prices were put under price controls. The result, as
would be predicted by supply-and-demand analysis, was that oil im-
ports grew rapidly. By 1979, a consensus developed that the equity
gains from oil-price controls were not worth the efficiency losses, and
domestic oil prices were gradually decontrolled.
2 2 7
Samuelson generalizes the example thus:
Interfering with the competitive supply-and-demand mechanism
is often an inefficient way of correcting the income distribution.
Whatever distribution you want to end up with can often be more ef-
ficiently attained by using the tax system to redistribute income than
by narrow interferences in a single market.
2 2 8
The United States has adopted such a tax-based distribution
system in times of rapid increase in fuel costs, in the form of
low-income energy grants and similar programs.22 9 Similarly,
the government does not attempt to keep food prices below
market but rather provides food stamps; nor does it attempt to
force privately funded medical care costs below market; in-
stead, the government provides Medicare.
These programs can be justified by the conclusion that the
marketplace cannot provide a solution to the problem of inequi-
table wealth distribution.230 While the allocations made by the
226. R. DORNBUSCH & S. FISCHER, MACROECONOMICS 564 (2d ed. 1981).
227. P. SAMUELSON & W. NoRDHAus, supra note 97, at 395; see also P. SAM-
UELSON, supra note 94, at 388 (referring to "ad hoc," "Robin Hood" interven-
tions in single markets).
228. P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 97, at 395.
229. See Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act of 1981, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 8621-8629 (1982). At least one court has considered the existence of such
transfer payments and redistribution systems as a ground for upholding esca-
lation clauses and rejecting public policy or unconscionability arguments.
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 505 F. Supp. 628, 633-42 (D.
Kan. 1980).
230. See R. DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 174-75. The market tends to pro-
duce a Pareto-optimal distribution, meaning one in which barter between con-
sumers cannot increase satisfaction. This condition, however, could be reached
without equitable distribution in a hypothetical satrapy in which the ruler is
fabulously wealthy but all other inhabitants remain in poverty. The introduc-
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marketplace are economically efficient within the existing
wealth distribution, a society must look elsewhere for a system
of social welfare. The existence of a humane as well as effi-
cient economic system may thus depend upon the maintenance
of transfer payments in the form of low-income energy assist-
ance or other general welfare systems.231 Either expressly or
intangibly, the recipients of transfer payments are and should
be supported by a tax upon all other producers and consumers.
By the same token, however, welfare issues should not be ad-
dressed by distortion of the market mechanism for those not
requiring public support because the distortion would reduce
efficiency. In the long run, holding natural gas prices below
market causes net disadvantages for the consuming public as a
whole, including low-income consumers, because it subsidizes
wasteful consumption.232 Thus the distributional argument jus-
tifies intervention, but it does not justify refusal to enforce es-
calation clauses.
A separate concern of distributive justice is that some geo-
graphic regions may experience economic losses due to rising
gas prices. A study sponsored by the Harvard Energy and Envi-
ronmental Policy Center, however, concludes that the north-
eastern region, including New York and New England, would
tion of market choices in such a nation would improve aggregate welfare by
increasing the efficiency of allocation of goods to each subject, but it would not
by itself remedy the inequitable distribution of wealth.
231. Economists often criticize in-kind welfare (such as food stamps or low-
income energy assistance) as theoretically inefficient in comparison to un-
restricted transfer payments because the recipient cannot allocate in-kind
assistance so as to maximize his satisfaction. See W. NICHoLSON, supra note
119, at 594. The political system, however, has typically insisted upon in-kind
assistance. See R. DORNBUSCH & S. FiscHER, supra note 226, at 564. This insis-
tence may be economically efficient if the political view is considered to be
based upon the notion that ignorance or external effects would cause recipi-
ents to misallocate cash payments.
Lifeline rates-or rates structured so that the amount of gas or electricity
necessary to maintain a modest home costs significantly less than amounts ex-
ceeding that amount-are an example of in-kind assistance. Governmental
adoption of such a rate design imposes a hidden tax upon the majority of con-
sumers because rates for amounts exceeding the lifeline amount are higher
than they would otherwise be, and non-needy consumers subsidize the lifeline.
The introduction of inefficiencies will be further exacerbated if the lifeline
amount is available to all consumers and not merely to those in need. The
subject of lifeline rates is therefore controversial.
232. See supra notes 84-105 and accompanying text. The negative effect
upon low-income consumers would be to enhance long-term price increases,
which must follow because the industry is characterized by declining returns
to scale. See supra notes 209-211 and accompanying text.
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experience a net gain from natural gas decontrol.233 A study of
the northwestern United States reaches the same result.234
While there might well be parts of the country that would be
net losers from complete natural gas decontrol, 235 that concern
alone does not justify a refusal to enforce contractual mecha-
nisms upon which the industry has traditionally relied236 be-
cause the nation as a whole would suffer significant efficiency
losses from such a policy.237
IV. ESCALATION CLAUSES AS AFFECTED BY PUBLIC
POLICY, CONTRACT INTERPRETATION, AND
SIMILAR DOCTRINES
Ordinarily, economic principles such as those discussed in
the preceding sections of this Article are not directly relevant
as evidence in contract litigation. Recently, however, public
concern over natural gas pricing clauses has prompted increas-
ing resort to arguments of public policy. Economic arguments
233. J. KALT, H. LEE, & R. LEONE, NATURAL GAs DECONTROL: A NORTH-
EAST INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE (Energy & Environmental Policy Center, John
F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Discussion Paper No.
E-82-08, 1982). The gains would result from a combination of increased energy
efficiency and ownership effects. Individuals, pension plans, businesses, and
other entities in the northeast own significant interests in natural gas produc-
tion. Thus not every resident of the northeast would gain from decontrol, and
indeed some would lose. The distributional concerns expressed elsewhere in
this section would then be relevant. See supra notes 227-232 and accompany-
ing text.
234. H. LEE, S. BENDER, & J. KALT, NATURAL GAS DECONTROL: A NORTH-
WEST INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE 49 (Energy & Environmental Policy Center,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Discussion Pa-
per No. E-83-09, 1983).
235. See J. KALT & R. LEONE, CAN A CONSUMING REGION WIN UNDER GA
DECONTROL?: A MODEL OF INCOME ACCRUAL, TRADE, AND STOCKHOLDING
(Energy & Environmental Policy Center, John F. Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, Harvard University, Discussion Paper No. E-84-08, 1984).
236. The question whether to retain escalators is a simpler one in terms of
regional impact than is the issue of decontrol. Some mechanism to adjust com-
pensation and risk is necessary to induce commitment of supply in any event.
Further, escalators are unlikely to have macroeconomic disadvantages (and
may even mitigate such disadvantages owing to their gradual effects). See, e.g.,
R. DORNBUSCH & S. FISCHER, MACROECONOMICS 526-28 (2d ed. 1981) (deleteri-
ous effects of price increases are lessened where price increases are anticipated
in advance).
237. Legitimate concern might be raised over the macroeconomic effects of
a sudden widespread increase in gas prices. This concern has most frequently
been expressed in connection with sudden decontrol. H. GRIFFIN & J. STEELE,
supra note 93, at 245-46. If the process is gradually phased in, however, even
decontrol shows "quite positive effects" in macroeconometric modelling. Id at
251.
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similar to those set forth in the preceding section are likely to
shape the issues in such cases.
A. PUBLIC POLICY AND UNCONSCIONABILITY ARGUMENTS
One of the leading cases concerning these issues is Kerr-
McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc.,238 in which the district
court, applying Wyoming law, refused to enforce a third-party
favored nations clause on the ground it was unconscionable and
against public policy.239 In reaching its decision, the court ac-
cepted the economic rent argument, concluding that because
the clause provided for prices exceeding cost of production, the
producers would receive "windfall profits." 0 As indicated in
the preceding section of this Article, this argument is invalid.2 1
The district court also considered the impact of price escalation
upon low-income consumers. It foresaw rapid and steep price
increases, which, the court reasoned, would dramatically and
"illegally" increase consumers' payments for necessary utili-
ties.242 The evidence actually showed that utility payments by
consumers had increased little as a result of the escalation
clause. The district court's reasoning was incorrect because,
among other things, it failed to take account of conservation.243
238. 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982); see also Texas
Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1960); Amoco
Prod. Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 505 F. Supp. 628, 639-42 (D. Kan.
1980).
In certain periods, pursuant to opinions of the FPC rendered under the
NGA, courts had acknowledged the argument that favored nations clauses
were against public policy. E.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
825-29 (1968); FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 39-45 (1968); Opinion 341, 25
F.P.C. 383, 388 (1961). See generally Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 372-83
(5th Cir. 1981). The FPC did permit escalation with area rate regulation
although it allowed increases only to regulated ceilings. Superior Oil Co. v.
Western Slope Gas Co., 604 F.2d 1281, 1291 (1979) (concurring opinion).
239. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 624, 633-36 (D.
Wyo. 1980), rev'd 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982).
240. Kerr-McGee, 500 F. Supp. at 636; cf. id. at 634 (The demands of Amoco,
Phillips, and Kerr-McGee would lead to "an inequitable, illegal and oppressive
result."). This economic rent or windfall profit argument is invalid since the
court's decision did not affect royalty payments to landowners, who, if anyone,
were the true recipients of rent. See supra notes 166-172 and accompanying
text.
241. See supra notes 162-172 and accompanying text.
242. Kerr-McGee, 500 F. Supp. at 634.
243. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant Kerr-McGee Corp. at 26, Kerr-McGee
Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir.) (record evidence showed
average monthly bill of consumers in service area to be $46.80, not $250 as
found by district court), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982); see also Brief of Ami-
cus Curiae The Legal Foundation of America, in id., at 19 (consumers in ser-
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The district court in Kerr-McGee also accepted the "one-
way street argument," holding that the escalation clause fa-
vored only the seller and would cause prices to rise.244 While
the latter comment was correct, the increase was inevitable in
light of the fact that natural gas is a depletable resource.245
Furthermore, the court's conclusion that the clause favored
only the seller was incorrect.2 6 Finally, the district court ac-
cepted the argument that historic costs of production were the
proper measure of prices.247 The court's reasoning was thus a
virtual compendium of the economic arguments against escala-
tion clauses.
The court of appeals reversed the district court and held
that the escalation clause should be enforced.2 8 The appellate
court did not venture far into the realm of economics and natu-
ral gas policy; its opinion properly stressed that these questions
should be resolved by the legislature.249 The court rejected the
unconscionability argument by recognizing that unconscionabil-
ity is found in situations so one-sided and oppressive that no
reasonable person would contract for them.2 50 Escalation
clauses in natural gas contracts, the court concluded, did not
meet this definition because they have legitimate market pur-
poses.2 1 Furthermore, as the court pointed out, the clause at
issue was advantageous to the buyer at the time it was agreed
vice area paid approximately two-thirds of national average price for utilities).
For a discussion of price elasticity and conservation, see supra notes 188-197.
244. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 624, 634-36 (D.
Wyo. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 989
(1982).
245. See supra notes 207-211.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 84-146. See also Louisiana-Nevada
Transit Co. v. Woods, 393 F. Supp. 177, 184 (W.D. Ark. 1975) ("The Favored
Nations Clause [sic] is a tool to enable a buyer to induce a seller to commit gas
reserves to the buyer for a long period of time."); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer
Chem. Co., 612 P.2d 463, 463 (Wyo. 1980).
247. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 673 F.2d 323, 326 n.7 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982). The district court accepted a kind of
implied vintaging, disallowing escalation based on small producer rates be-
cause of limitations not applicable to the contract itself. Id at 326 n.7.
248. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 673 F.2d 323, 329-30 (10th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982).
249. Id. at 325-28.
250. Id. at 329-30; see also id. at 329 (setting forth factors leading to a deter-
mination of contract unconscionability including absence of meaningful choice,
compulsion, lack of opportunity for meaningful negotiation, and gross inequal-
ity of bargaining power).
251. Id. at 329.
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2 5 2
The court also rejected the parallel argument that the esca-
lation clause was against public policy. In so doing, the court
relied on Wyoming's failure to take action restraining escala-
tion clauses 253 and Congress' adoption of the NGPA.2- These
factors, the court concluded, indicated a legislative policy to
rely in part on the functioning of the market and not to require
cost justification of all elements of price.255 The NGPA sanc-
tioned price escalation clauses, and the producers in question
were not attempting to collect prices in excess of the price ceil-
ings applicable to them.256 These prices, as the court pointed
out, were defined by law as just and reasonable.2 7 The appel-
late court's conclusions in this regard were legally sound and,
within the constraints imposed by regulatory imperfections,
they were generally consistent with economic principles as
well.
B. "IMPLIED VINTAGING" AS A LIMIT ON ESCALATION
CLAUSES
Unconscionability and public policy are not the only doc-
trines that have been used to argue against escalation clauses.
A related argument, illustrated by the case of Superior Oil Co.
v. Western Slope Gas Co.,258 uses the regulatory concept of
252. Id. at 328, 330.
253. Some states have enacted intrastate price ceilings below NGPA maxi-
mums. E.g., Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-
1401 to -1415 (1983). The court considered the absence of any such legislation
in Wyoming to be "significant" in this regard; furthermore, it found the deci-
sion in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 612 P.2d 463, 465-68 (Wyo.
1980), enforcing a favored nations clause, to be instructive.
254. Kerr-McGee, 673 F.2d at 325-27.
255. The court of appeals agreed with the decision reached by the majority
in Superior Oil and concluded that "[t]he actual value of a product is deter-
mined by what people will pay for it, not by what it costs to produce," and
noted that the NGPA "provides for a free market" in the long run. Kerr-Mc-
Gee, 673 F.2d at 328 n.9 (citing Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 604
F.2d 1281, 1291 nn.15-16 (10th Cir. 1979)).
256. The court pointed out that 18 C.F.R. § 270.205(b)(1) (1981) provided as
follows:
Any contractual provision for a change in price may operate according
to the terms of such provision except that such provision is not opera-
tive to authorize a seller to charge and collect an amount in excess of
the highest applicable NGPA rate.
Kerr-McGee, 673 F.2d at 326 n.6.
257. Id at 325-27.
258. 604 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1979).
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vintaging259 to limit the effect of escalation clauses. In Supe-
rior Oil, the purchasing pipeline argued that the policy under-
lying federal natural gas regulation or, in the alternative,
principles of contract interpretation found in Colorado law, re-
quired that the vintaging concepts applicable to the regulated
interstate market be extended to the unregulated intrastate
market.260 The court of appeals rejected the argument, finding
that it reflected neither legislative policy nor the intention of
the contracting parties. 261 The court expressly rejected the ar-
gument that price should be tied to the cost of production, hold-
ing instead that, up to ceiling prices, value and hence price
were to be determined by contracts made in the marketplace.262
Superior Oil represents one view of the implied vintaging
issue, a view that appears both legally and economically sound.
Similar cases in other jurisdictions, however, have sometimes
reached different results. For example, in Tuthill v. Southwest-
ern Public Service Co.,263 a Texas appellate court injected
259. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
260. As do most such favored nations clauses, the one at issue in Superior
Oil provided for adjustment of the index price in light of differences in "qual-
ity of the gas, bases of measurement, delivery pressure, and other conditions of
sale.. . ." Superior Oil 604 F.2d at 1282 (emphasis added). The purchaser ar-
gued that the phrase "other conditions of sale" included vintage, even if vin-
tage were otherwise inapplicable to the transaction. The court rejected this
argument, relying upon course of dealing, ejusdem generis, expressions of in-
tent, and commercial purpose. Id. at 1288-91.
261. Id. at 1289-91.
262. I& at 1291 nn.15-16; see supra note 255.
263. 614 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Tut-
hill concerned a price escalation clause that was triggered by any "applicable
just and reasonable area ceiling rate . . . established by the Federal Power
Commission." Id. at 207 (emphasis added). The Court of Civil Appeals af-
firmed the decision of the trial court, which found that the escalating clause
was triggered by FPC Opinion No. 742, 54 F.P.C. 853 (1975), and FPC Opinion
No. 749, 54 F.P.C. 3090 (1975), thus entitling the appellant to a money judge-
ment. Tuthill, at 208, 215. The court also held that the clause was unambigu-
ous, and it therefore considered only the four corners of the instrument. Id. at
210-11. The trial court had found, as a fact, that "the parties" "intended that
the price escalation clause . . .would mean that the maximum and highest
rate set by the FPC for gas sold in the geographical area ... would become
the contract price. . . ." Finding of Fact No. 50, Record at 111, TuthilZ set
forth in Petitioner's Application for Writ of Error at 10. The appellate court's
implication of vintaging thus appears to have defeated the parties' expecta-
tions.
In Amoco Prod. Co. v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 674 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Ct.
App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court came to the same result without
the presence of the word "applicable" because of a trial court finding that the
parties intended to price the gas as though it were sold in interstate commerce,
or in other words, to price it as though it were vintaged. Id. at 472; see also
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vintaging limits into an intrastate contract by analogizing to
legislation regulating interstate contracts. The court reached
this result even though the trial court had expressly found that
the parties did not intend to incorporate vintaging into the
contract.26
A court's finding of implied vintaging contrary to the par-
ties' expectation can have results similar to holding an escala-
tion clause against public policy. It cannot be justified by
principles of contract interpretation, and it is unsound economi-
cally for the same reasons that a general prohibition upon esca-
lation clauses would be unsound.2 65 To the extent that the
result is dictated by contract interpretation, however, vintaged
price escalation may be appropriate. If the parties have genu-
inely adopted vintaged prices as their index, 266 legitimate ex-
pectations are protected when that index is followed, and the
assumption that the parties have appropriately adjusted the to-
tal consideration in light of all aspects of the sale may be justi-
fied. The difficulty with such reasoning is that, in many cases,
a finding of implied vintaging is based upon diffuse evidence
Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 230 Kan. 176, 182-85, 630
P.2d 1142, 1148-49 (1981) (area rate clause held vintaged), affd, 459 U.S. 400
(1983); Oxley v. Oklahoma Gas and Elec. Co., No. 55,655 (Okla. Ct. App. May 4,
1982), reported in 53 OKLA. B.J. 1161, 1162 (1982), rev'd and dissenting op.
adopted, No. 55,655 (Okla. Oct. 4, 1982), reported in 53 OxLA. B.J. 2383, 2383
(1982) (the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermedi-
ate appellate court and remanded to determine whether parties intended
vintaging of area rate clause); cf. Continental Oil Co. v. Southern Union Gas
Co., No. 48543 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Oct. 10, 1975) (favored nations clause held im-
pliedly vintaged).
264. The appellate court observed, "Naturally, the appellants desired to ob-
tain the highest and best available price for their gas.... [Tjhe appellees
wanted to obtain a long-term and reliable source of gas." Tuthill, 614 S.W.2d
at 210. These consideration contravene the holding.
265. The FPC itself referred to vintaging as "an anachronism" which
"[olperates to discourage development of the full productive capacity of acre-
age committed to the interstate market." Area Rates for the Appalachian and
Illinois Basin Areas, Opinion 639, 48 F.P.C. 1299, 1309 (1972). In National
Rates for Jurisdictional Sales of Natural Gas, Opinion 770, 56 F.P.C. 509, 521,
566 (1976), the Commission restated its awareness that vintaging was problem-
atic and its elimination desirable, but retained it because of the need to pre-
vent dislocation of purchasers, who had entered into transactions in apparent
reliance on vintaging and were affected by unexpected increases.
266. Thus, for example, the Superior Oil opinion discloses that Western
Slope Gas Company bargained for express provisions specifically incorporating
vintaging in some of its contracts containing area rate clauses. Western Slope's
stated purpose was "to make absolutely clear that [vintaging] was to be a fac-
tor in the implementation of those clauses." Superior Oil, 604 F.2d at 1284. In
such a case, the intention to vintage should be honored as reflecting the bar-
gained-for consideration. See also infra notes 281-282 and accompanying text.
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concerning the intent of the contracting parties. This evidence
contradicts the natural inference that parties under no compul-
sion to do otherwise would agree on prices approximating mar-
ket levels. 26 7 If a purpose to agree to prices far below market is
lightly attributed to the producer, legitimate contract expecta-
tions may be defeated and inefficient allocation of resources
may result-an outcome that is inconsistent with sound public
policy.
C. AREA RATE CLAUSES AND NGPA PRICES
Some opponents of escalation clauses use the enactment of
the NGPA in 1978 to argue that area rate or FPC price protec-
tion clauses should not be enforced.268 Area rate clauses index
the contract price to governmentally set price ceilings. 269 By
including reference to area rate regulation, the argument
posits, the parties have agreed to be bound by the administra-
tive process of FPC rate setting, including its cost-based ele-
ments. Enactment of the NGPA reflected a shift in public
policy, the argument continues, and the NGPA-generated rates
are different in nature from those set by the FPC under the
NGA-or so it is claimed.270 These arguments, in turn, are fol-
lowed by the conclusion that area rate clauses do not cause es-
calation to NGPA ceilings.27 1 The result, if this theory is
accepted, is that prices are frozen at pre-NGPA levels for the
duration of the contract term.
One obvious difficulty with this argument is that it results
267. See supra note 264.
268. This argument was considered and rejected in Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 674 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) and Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 230
Kan. 176, 183-84, 630 P.2d 1142, 1149 (1981). Cf. Oxley v. Oklahoma Gas and
Elec. Co., No. 55,655 (Okla. Ct. App. May 4, 1982), reported in 53 OKLA. B.J.
1161, 1162 (1982), rev'd and dissenting op. adopted, No. 55,655 (Okla. Oct. 4,
1982), reported in 53 OKLA. B.J. 2383, 2383 (1982) (the Oklahoma Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate appellate court and re-
manded to determine whether parties intended vintaging of area rate clause).
The argument was accepted in UGI Corp. v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 80-1411, slip
op. at 2, 16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 1984).
269. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
270. See, ag., Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 367 (5th Cir. 1981) (be-
cause some aspects of NGPA regulation substantially differed from that of
NGA, doubt arose as to NGPA's effect upon area rate clauses in existing inter-
state contracts), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
271. Pennzoi4 645 F.2d at 368 (FERC initially announced in a policy state-
ment that area rate clauses did not constitute contractual authority for collec-
tion of NGPA ceiling prices, but it later altered that interpretation).
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in no escalation at all and thereby defeats the purpose behind
tying prices to an index over the life of the contract. The low
rates of early years are not followed by higher rates in later
years even though market prices, and indeed governmentally
regulated rates, continue to increase. This result defeats the le-
gitimate contract expectations of the parties and creates eco-
nomic inefficiencies.
Fortunately, the argument that area rate clauses were cut
off by the NGPA has been rejected in the majority of cases.
The FERC initially accepted this argument but then rejected it
as a general matter of contract interpretation; the Fifth Circuit
affirmed this latter holding in Pennzoil Company v. FERC.272
The court noted that the vast majority of purchasers and sellers
before the FERC concurred in interpreting area rate clauses as
reaching NGPA levels. It concluded that the commercial pur-
pose of escalation clauses justified a presumption that area rate
clauses authorized escalation to NGPA prices.273 This result is
272. 645 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982). The
Fifth Circuit affirmed FERC Order 23, 6 F.E.R.C. 61,229 (1979), as well as
orders on clarification and rehearing following Order 23. Pennzoi, 645 F.2d at
365 n.3. In a policy statement preceding those orders, FERC had intially an-
nounced that "under a plain meaning construction, area rate clauses [did] not
constitute contractual authority for the collection of NGPA ceiling prices."
Pennzoil, 645 F.2d at 368. In Order 23 and its progeny, FERC concluded that
this initial view was erroneous, and it instead looked to the legislative history
of the NGPA, the purpose of escalation clauses, and other factors. It reversed
its prior position and allowed a presumption of escalation to NGPA ceilings in
otherwise ambiguous situations. Final Regulations Amending and Clarifying
Regulations Under the Natural Gas Policy Act and the Natural Gas Act, 44
Fed. Reg. 16, 895 (1979).
In Independent Oil and Gas Ass'n of West Virginia, 10 F.E.R.C. 1 61,214
(1980), the Commission further considered area rate clauses in an effort to de-
termine which NGPA ceiling would be reached by a given escalation clause.
Depending upon the language of the contract, an otherwise ambiguous clause
could be construed to reach, on the one hand, sections 104 and 106(a) prices for
old flowing or rollover gas, or, on the other hand, a level as high as the section
102 price for new gas. In essence, the difference would be found in whether
the parties' contract (or current interpretation) reflected a strong preference
for the NGA-FPC approach and failed to contain "uncoupling" language con-
templating a successor to the FPC such as the FERC or the Congress. In that
event, the lower 104-106(a) rate would be presumed to carry out the parties'
intent. Otherwise, the presumption would favor the section 102 price. Id
273. 645 F.2d at 387-90. The presumption applies only when reliable evi-
dence of intent and current agreement upon interpretation are lacking. In-
dependent Oil and Gas Ass'n of West Virginia, 10 F.E.R.C. 61,214 (1980).
The presumption can be overcome by evidence, id., and thus contracts with
identical language can give different results. See Kansas Power & Light Co. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 8 F.E.R.C. 61,155 (1979); Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v.
Frank F. Hall, 7 F.E.R.C. 61,175 (1979); see also Pennzoil 645 F.2d at 386.
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sound both legally and economically and is consistent with the
legitimate contract expectations of the parties.
On the other hand, a few courts have reached the opposite
result either as a matter of contract interpretation 74 or
through interpretation of the NGPA.275 If the parties have
truly contracted with the intent to cut off the index, this result
is appropriate; however, courts should not lightly infer that a
producer would agree to such a commercially unwise approach.
Furthermore, courts should not infer an intention to freeze
price at below-market levels simply because the index has
failed. The Uniform Commercial Code provides for the substi-
tution of a new index, generally the market price, in such a sit-
uation.2 7 6 Finally, the NGPA itself does not support the
argument that escalation clauses should be cut off below NGPA
levels. The NGPA reflects a policy of phased deregulation, sup-
ports the enforcement of contracts, and is consistent with the
use of market considerations in pricing.277
D. PRODUCER ARGUMENTS FOR CEILING PRICES WITHOUT
CONTRACT AUTHORITY
Producers have occasionally turned the tables and used the
economic arguments in favor of escalation clauses as support
for the contention that contract prices should be allowed to es-
calate to market or ceiling rates, even though their contracts
have provided to the contrary. Thus, in Amoco Production Co.
v. Western Slope Gas Co.278 the contract was expressly indexed
to vintaged area rates, but the producer sought to avoid the
vintaging qualification and to collect the highest ceiling price
set for any gas. The court rejected the argument and enforced
274.. E.g., UGI Corp. v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 80-1141, slip op. at 2, 16 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 1, 1984).
275. E.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 229 Kan. 631,
636-38, 629 P.2d 190, 194-95 (1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).
276. U.C.C. § 2-305(1)(c) (1977).
277. NGPA § 121, 15 U.S.C. § 3331 (1982); see Pierce, supra note 16, at 89.
Cf. Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d at 372-79 (FERC argued and court held
that NGPA provisions did not preclude escalation under existing contract to
NGPA price ceilings and did not limit operation of area rate clauses). The
FERC so disagreed with the Kansas Supreme Court's interpretation of the
NGPA as precluding such escalation in Mesa that it took the unusual step of
supporting Mesa's petition for certiorari, even though FERC itself was not a
party to the dispute. Brief of FERC in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 4-
8, Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 229 Kan. 631, 629 P.2d
190 (1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).
278. 535 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Colo. 1982).
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the contract as written with the vintaging requirement
intact.279
The producer might argue that such a result is economi-
cally unsound because below-market rates distort the function
of the price system. Vintaging is itself economically un-
sound.280 Thus, if the contract is ambiguous and if there is no
convincing evidence of an intent to vintage, the commercial
purpose of the escalator should enable the producer to receive a
non-vintaged price.281 On the other hand, the decision in favor
of the pipeline purchaser in an express vintaging case such as
Amoco Production Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co. can be justified
by the policy favoring accurate interpretation and enforcement
of contracts. In a dynamic market, there will be some sales be-
low as well as above market as buyers and sellers work toward
the equilibrium point, and the concern for commercial stability
and legitimate expectations is advanced when the intentions of
the parties are carried out.282
E. SOUND ECONOMIC REASONING IN A GAS CASE:
AN EXAMPLE
Perhaps the best available example of the use of economic
reasoning in a natural gas public policy case is the district
court's opinion on remand in Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope
Gas Co.283 The arguments against escalation clauses ranged
from implied vintaging to unconscionability, and the evidence
included extensive presentation of economic testimony. The
district court's conclusion after remand appropriately summa-
rized the economic and legal concerns:
In support of their contention that the clause is not contrary to public
policy, Plaintiffs presented the testimony of three economic and en-
ergy-related experts.....
All three agreed that the purpose of price escalation clauses...
is to keep the price of natural gas at approximately the competitive
market level over the life of the long-term contracts. They were also
strenuously in agreement that the value of natural gas is what the
279. Id. at 1308-09.
280. Vintaging is economically unsound because it ties price to historical
cost. See supra notes 173-177.
281. This result was reached, for example, in both Superior Oil Co. v.
Western Slope Gas Co., 604 F.2d, 1281, 1289-91 (10th Cir. 1979), and Kerr-Mc-
Gee Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 673 F.2d 323, 326-27 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 989 (1982), in which purchasers attempted to imply vintaging into con-
tracts that did not refer to it. See supra notes 238-267 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 84-129 and accompanying text.
283. 549 F. Supp. 463 (D. Colo. 1982), affd, 758 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985).
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marketplace puts on it; the cost of production is not the basis of
"value." In their opinions, the natural laws of supply and demand
create the best reflection of the value of natural gas. When gas is arti-
ficially priced below the customer's expectation, as was felt to be the
case throughout the FPC's tight regulation of the industry, the cus-
tomer will demand more natural gas. However, low prices provide no
incentive to the producers to explore and develop new natural gas
reserves. Thus, in time, the proved reserves are depleted, resulting in
the kind of natural gas shortage experienced in the United States in
the mid-1970's. 2 84
The court pointed out that these effects were not subject to se-
rious challenge: "Even Western Slope's witnesses had to agree
that higher prices would normally act as an incentive to pro-
duce new gas reserves. '285 The court also accepted testimony to
the effect that "higher prices also reduce the demand for the
commodity. ' 28 6 The result of higher prices would be the "bal-
ancing of supply and demand, with the value of the gas existing
at the competitive market level." 28 7
Finally, the court analyzed the economic function of escala-
tion clauses in the industry:
In addition to such clauses not being against public policy, Plain-
tiffs maintained that such clauses were vital to the natural gas indus-
try as presently structured. Long-term supplies of natural gas are
necessary before a regulatory agency will issue a certificate of public
convenience and necessity to a pipeline [that] desires to build or ex-
pand [its] transmission system .... Aside from the assurance of an
adequate supply of natural gas .... [one witness] testified that the
consumer benefits in another way from the utilization of price escala-
tion clauses .... Without such a clause, the producer is in effect be-
ing asked to assume one hundred percent of the risk of the contract.
That is a risk the producer will want to be compensated for in terms
of a significantly higher contract price from the very beginning.288
Over the dissent of one judge who accepted the "one-way
street" argument, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court.
2 89
284. Ia at 470-71.
285. Ida at 471.
286. Id
287. Id
288. Id-
289. Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 758 F.2d 500, 502-03 (10th
Cir. 1985). The one-way street argument is discussed supra text accompanying
notes 207-211, together with arguments for concluding that it is fallacious. The
court of appeals' opinion is narrowly based, but the economic justifications dis-
cussed in this Article underlie the cases upon which it relies.
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CONCLUSION
Natural gas escalators reflect an effort to cause prices
roughly to follow market levels throughout the duration of
long-term contracts. Purchasers require lengthy terms because
they need assurance of adequate supplies, and the producers'
reciprocal insistence upon contract provisions that relate prices
to market levels is therefore understandable. Furthermore, it
is economically desirable for prices to be related to market
levels throughout the life of a long-term contract. Prices below
market induce inefficient consumption of gas, discourage con-
servation of a depletable resource, and prevent producers from
furnishing adequate supply. The predictable result of a policy
that maintains gas prices at below-market levels is shortages.
The economic arguments against escalation clauses may be
superficially appealing, but most are economically unsound.
The monopoly argument fails because field prices are competi-
tive. The economic rent or windfall argument is inapposite as
producers do not receive rent, and a policy that reduces prices
because of rent has undesirable effects on consumption in any
event. The price inelasticity argument is unpersuasive, because
conservation is the empirically observed response to price
increases.
As for purchased gas allowances, they do enable pipelines
to accommodate producers in the short run without adverse ef-
fects. Such concessions are reciprocated, however, and they
may represent efficient long-run market behavior since pipe-
line incentives toward efficiency in the long run, though imper-
fect, do exist. The recognized difficulties of pipeline rate design
may require reform, but they would not be solved by the impo-
sition of the major disadvantages that would accompany abroga-
tion of escalators.
Nor does the tendency of escalation clauses to increase
price justify a refusal to enforce them since the industry exhib-
its declining returns to scale and hence must reflect increasing
prices in the long run. Sometimes the indexes used in escala-
tors produce inappropriate results, particularly owing to quirks
of regulation or to take-or-pay clauses. These dysfunctional ef-
fects may provide the context in which escalators should be in-
terpreted, but they do not justify their abrogation. Finally,
distributive justice is a valid concern, but it should not be
achieved by means of distortion of the price-signalling mecha-
nism for all consumers.
In general, the response of the courts to these economic ar-
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guments has been appropriate. Refusal to recognize unconscio-
nability or public policy doctrines as rationales for invalidating
escalation clauses is today the prevailing view, and this result is
sound. On the other hand, the application of the doctrine of
contract interpretation to escalation clauses produces mixed re-
sults. Some courts have lightly attributed to producers an im-
probable intention to agree to long-term prices significantly
below market levels and regulated price ceilings. Most courts,
however, have recognized the economic function of escalation
clauses and have refused to construe them in a manner that
would thwart their function.
In the future, there will continue to be great public interest
in natural gas price escalation clauses as declining supply places
upward pressure on prices. While this effect will prompt fur-
ther efforts to invoke the authority of courts and legislatures to
invalidate escalation clauses or defeat their function, it is to be
hoped that such efforts can be resisted. Invalidating escalation
clauses would reward consumers in the short run with the
golden egg, but at the cost of having killed the goose.
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